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In this prosperous information age, to protect copyright of digital contents is an
urgent problem to be solved. Protection against digital content copyright violation
is an important but difficult challenge. The fingerprinting technique can be used
to resist collusion attacks of illegal key redistribution for broadcast encryption and
collusion attacks of illegal content redistribution for multimedia contents.
This dissertation is devoted to study anti-collusion schemes for broadcast en-
cryption and anti-collusion codes for multimedia fingerprinting, which are based on
the fingerprinting technique, by virtue of combinatorial methods, such as tools in
extremal set theory, extremal graph theory, probabilistic methods and combinatorial
design theory. We derive new upper and lower bounds for the anti-collusion combi-
natorial structures and also provide constructions to achieve our new bounds, which
greatly improve the previously known results and further promote the development
of broadcast encryption and multimedia fingerprinting.
Traceability schemes (TSs) were introduced by Stinson and Wei [85] as a gener-
alization of traceability codes proposed by Chor, Fiat and Naor [25, 26]. Cover-free
families (CFFs) were introduced by Kautz and Singleton [60] in the disguise of bina-
ry superimposed codes. In this dissertation, we find a very interesting phenomenon,
that is, a t-TS is in fact a t2-CFF. Based on this new relationship, we derive new
upper bounds for TSs by exploiting a combinatorial structure called own-subset,
investigated by Erdős, Frankl and Füredi in [39]. We construct many infinite fam-
ilies of optimal TSs, achieving the new upper bounds, by means of sunflowers and
combinatorial designs. A constructive lower bound for TSs is also given, which has
the same order of magnitude as the upper bounds.
We introduce a unified concept of parent-identifying schemes to include many
combinatorial structures with the parent-identifying properties as special cases. An
equivalent relationship between parent-identifying schemes and forbidden configu-
rations is established. Moreover, we correspond the research problems of parent-
identifying schemes to a kind of Turán-type problems. The original idea of parent-
identifying codes was introduced by Hollmann et al. in [53]. Collins [29] studied the
parent-identifying set systems (IPPS) for broadcast encryption. In this dissertation,
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we give an improvement on the known upper bound for IPPS by using techniques
in extremal set theory. A probabilistic lower bound for IPPS is also provided, which
has the same order of magnitude as the new upper bound. Furthermore, better
upper bounds for 2-IPPS(4, v) and 3-IPPS(6, v) are respectively derived by means
of the graph removal lemma in extremal graph theory.
We introduce a special kind of CFFs, called union-intersection-bounded families
(UIBFs), due to its applications in broadcast encryption. The relationships among
UIBF, TS, IPPS and CFF are investigated. The upper bounds and lower bounds
for UIBF are provided, which have the same order of magnitude for certain cases.
Multimedia parent-identifying codes (MIPPCs) were introduced by Cheng et
al. [22] for multimedia fingerprinting. In the literature, there is no lower bound
for general MIPPCs. We show the first probabilistic existence result for MIPPCs,
which asymptotically achieves the known upper bound in certain cases and is very
close to the known upper bound in other cases.
Finally, we conclude the work presented in this dissertation. Some open problems
related with the topics in this dissertation are also discussed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the development of communication networks, an urgent problem to be solved
is to protect copyright of digital content owing to the ease of copying and manip-
ulating multimedia data. Protection against digital content copyright violation is
an important but difficult challenge. Digital content can be encrypted before it is
transmitted to prevent attacks from unauthorized users. However, all content must
eventually be decrypted before it will be intelligible to authorized users. Then the
decrypted content may potentially be redistributed by some malicious authorized
users. In order to personalize the copyrighted content assigned to the authorized
user and rule out the unauthorized redistribution of digital content, digital finger-
printing was introduced to identify the authorized customers who redistribute their
content for unintended purposes [19]. Its fundamental problem is to design efficient
tracing algorithms based on fingerprinting codes which enable tracing to be carried
out. The following are two typical types of copyright violation described in [83].
• Illegal key redistribution: Assuming that content is encrypted, there must be
a mechanism for the content to be decrypted by an authorized user. The key
used to decrypt the content may be copied and distributed to other users.
Alternatively, these keys may be combined to create a new pirate decoder,
which can subsequently be used to decrypt encrypted content illegally.
• Illegal content redistribution: Encrypted content is invariably decrypted once
it gets to its authorized destination. Decrypted content can then be copied
and transmitted to others, for example in an illegal pirate broadcast.
The main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the anti-collusion key-
distribution schemes for broadcast encryption and the anti-collusion codes for mul-
timedia fingerprinting from the combinatorial viewpoint.
1.1 Broadcast encryption
Broadcast provides an efficient way to send information to many users simultane-
ously, that is one-to-many communication but not one-to-one communication. This
is useful and profitable for the commercial broadcasting such as pay-TV, especial-
ly when a large number of long-lived users are designated. Naturally, the security
problem of the broadcast network comes with it.
To protect the copyright of the broadcasted information, the distributor will first
encrypt the data and then broadcast the encrypted information. Each authorized
user, who paid for the copyright, can get a key from the distributor to decrypt the
received encrypted information. Figure 1.1 provides a possible illustration of this
situation. In the first stage, the distributor Bob may encrypt the data and upload
Figure 1.1: An illustration of broadcast encryption [94]
to the public cloud. In the second stage, the authorized users Alice, Ted, Tim can
download the encrypted file from the public platform and then decrypt it by using
their assigned keys. If Alice, Ted and Tim are assigned the same key by Bob, then
any one of them may pass his/her key to an unauthorized user without fear of being
tracked down.
To hinder the illegal key redistribution, the distributor will personalize each au-
thorized user by assigning a unique key as his/her personal key, which is essentially
the same as that of digital fingerprinting in [19]. In this situation, the individual
attack rarely occur. Since if one user, say Alice, illegally redistributes her personal
key and once an illegal usage is captured, then Alice can be easily identified ac-
cording to her personal key. As depicted in [83], the illegal key redistribution may
mainly come from a collusion attack that some dishonest authorized users (traitors)
work together to generate a pirate decoder and then redistribute it illegally. The
key-distribution schemes for broadcast encryption are required to have some secure
properties to resist the collusion attack. The following are two kinds of secure re-
quirements which are widely investigated. Suppose that the number of traitors in
2
the collusion does not exceed a predetermined threshold t.
• For any pirate decoder generated by the collusion attack, if it is confiscat-
ed, then at least one traitor will be traced back by virtue of some tracing
algorithms.
• Any innocent user or group of a limited users cannot be framed by the collusion
attack.
Here we remark that the traceability, in the static scenario, is only required to
identify at least one traitor but not all traitors from a confiscated pirate. Since in
a collusion, although a pirate is generated by several colluders, but it only contains
partial information of each colluder. If one asks to trace back to all colluders from
a pirate, then the desired security property is too strong and the corresponding
schemes only can hold very few users.
In the literature, Fiat and Tassa [43] introduced the “dynamic traitor tracing” to
identify all up to t traitors, where they assumed that the colluders do not construct
a pirate decoder but decrypt the content and rebroadcast it [74]. The dynamic
traitor tracing algorithms were also investigated by Berkman, Parnas and Sgall [12],
Tassa [89], Roelse [71] and Laarhoven, Doumen, Roelse, Škorić and Weger [64].
Considering also in the dynamic scenario, Safavi-Naini and Wang [74] introduced
the “sequential traitor tracing” to identify all up to t traitors, which improves the
dynamic traitor tracing in the sense that it reduces computation by the broadcaster,
and more importantly reduces the impact of delayed broadcasting by the pirate on
the efficiency of the tracing process [14]. About the traceability in the dynamic
scenario, the interested reader is referred to [12, 14, 43, 64, 71, 74, 89].
In this dissertation, we mainly focus on the key management schemes in the
static scenario. In the following, we list four kinds of combinatorial structures for
key-distribution schemes.
 Traceability schemes
In 1994, Chor, Fiat and Naor introduced a traitor tracing scheme, the Chor-Fiat-
Naor traceability scheme, applied to the broadcast encryption [25, 26]. To prevent
unauthorized users from accessing the data, the data supplier encrypts the data
blocks with session keys and gives the authorized users personal keys to decrypt
them. Some unauthorized users (pirate users) might obtain some decryption keys
from a group of traitors. Then the pirate users can decrypt data that they are not
entitled to [85]. If a pirate decoder is confiscated, the Chor-Fiat-Naor traceability
scheme can trace back to at least one traitor, by comparing the number of common
base keys between the pirate decoder and each user’s personal key, on the assump-
tion that the number of traitors in the collusion does not exceed a predetermined
threshold t.
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In 1998, Stinson and Wei [85] generalized the Chor-Fiat-Naor traceability scheme
to the Stinson-Wei traceability scheme. As stated in [85], in a broadcast encryption
system, the data supplier generates a base set X of v keys and assigns w base
keys to each authorized user, as the user’s personal key. All authorized users can
recover the session keys K, which are used to decrypt the data blocks, by using
their personal keys. In the Chor-Fiat-Naor traceability scheme, the set X of base
keys is partitioned into w subsets S1, . . . ,Sw (each of size v/w). Each personal key
is a transversal of (S1, . . . ,Sw) (i.e., it contains exactly one base key from each Si).
In this case, the pirate decoder generated by several traitors is also a transversal
of (S1, . . . ,Sw), since otherwise the pirate decoder can not work. However, in the
Stinson-Wei traceability scheme, each personal key is not necessarily a transversal.
A personal key can be made up of any selection of w base keys from the set X .
The data supplier can use a w out of v threshold secret sharing scheme (such as
the Shamir threshold scheme [75], for example) to construct v shares of the key K
and then encrypt each share with a base key in X . The pirate decoder can be made
up of any w different base keys from the union of each traitor’s personal key. If
such a pirate decoder is captured and the size of the coalition does not exceed a
predetermined threshold t, the Stinson-Wei traceability scheme also can reveal at
least one traitor in the collusion by detecting the users who share the maximum
base keys with the pirate decoder.
The Chor-Fiat-Naor traceability scheme is popular with the notion of “trace-
ability code (TA code)”. Upper bounds on the size of 2-TA codes and 3-TA codes
were studied in [17] and [78], respectively. However, according to what we know, the
upper bounds for general t-TA codes is still an open problem, which was conjectured
in [17] by Blackburn, Etzion and Ng. The combinatorial properties for t-TA codes
using error correcting codes were investigated in [42, 57, 82]. A construction for
t-TA codes by virtue of constant weight codes was given in [65]. Infinite families of
q-ary t-TA codes of constant rate bounded away from zero were proved to exist for
small q in [17] and [59]. The Stinson-Wei traceability scheme has been studied as
“traceability scheme (TS)”. Upper bounds on the size of TS were studied in [29, 85],
and constructions for TS were investigated in [68, 73, 85]. Objects related with
traceability schemes, such as key distribution patterns, also have been studied by
numerous researchers, see [81, 84, 93], for example.
 Parent-identifying schemes
In 1998, Hollmann, van Lint, Linnartz and Tolhuizen proposed a digital finger-
printing scheme, based on codes with the identifiable parent property (IPP codes),
to protect against piracy of software by embedding fingerprints into the copyrighted
contents [53]. Given an IPP code, it is possible for every pirate copy (descendant) of
digital content to identify at least one of its parents, that is, those authorized users
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each assigned with a fingerprint that contribute to the pirate copy, by computing
the intersection of all groups of possible parents who can produce the pirate copy,
again on the assumption that the number of parents in the collusion does not exceed
a predetermined threshold t. IPP codes have been extensively studied in the liter-
ature, such as considering bounds on the maximum size of a t-IPP code [4, 6, 13],
efficient traitor tracing algorithms for IPP codes [10], and relationships between IPP
codes and separating hash families [2, 9, 77].
In 2009, Collins [29] suggested parent-identifying set systems (IPP set systems,
or IPPSs) for broadcast encryption, which can be regarded as a generalization of
IPP codes. The point of generalization from an IPP code to an IPPS is essentially
the same as that from the Chor-Fiat-Naor traceability scheme to the Stinson-Wei
traceability scheme, that is, instead of considering w-tuples, we consider w-subsets.
Just as in the case of IPP codes, when a pirate copy is confiscated, the traitor tracing
algorithm based on t-IPPS also needs to compute the intersection of all groups of
possible parents with size at most t. Compared to the Stinson-Wei traceability
scheme, the traitor tracing scheme based on IPPS can accommodate more users,
but at the expenses of tracing efficiency.
 Cover-free families
Cover-free families (CFFs) were introduced in 1964 by Kautz and Singleton
[60] to study binary superimposed codes. Variants of this formulation have been
investigated related to subjects such as information theory [60], group testing [55,
76], multiple access communication [41] and combinatorics [34, 35, 38, 46]. A t-CFF
is a family of finite sets (blocks) in which no block is covered by the union of t
others. From the viewpoint of broadcast system, a t-CFF is a kind of scheme in
which any t traitors can not create another authorized user’s personal key, which is
closely related to a frameproof code used in digital copyright protection [19]. The
relationship between frameproof codes and cover-free families was investigated in
[82]. Frameproof codes were studied by numerous researchers, see [15, 20, 79, 85],
for example.
In broadcast encryption, Chor, Fiat and Naor [25] studied the key-distribution
schemes based on t-CFFs and mentioned that they can guarantee that any innocent
user will not be framed by a coalition of size at most t. Although the CFFs may not
have the traceability as that from TSs or IPPSs, but the key-distribution schemes
based on CFFs can accommodate much more users than IPPSs.
 Union-intersection-bounded families
As shown by Chor, Fiat and Naor [25], the schemes based on t-CFFs ensure that
any innocent user can not be framed by a coalition of size at most t. However, t-CFFs
cannot make sure that a group of s ≥ 2 innocent users is not framed by any other
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coalition of size at most t. Inspired by this, we introduce a special kind of CFFs,
called union-intersection-bounded families (UIBFs). The key-distribution schemes
based on (s, t;w)-UIBFs can provide this desired security requirement. That is, the
scheme based on (s, t;w)-UIBF guarantees that any group G of up to t traitors can
not frame any other group G′ of up to s users provided that G ∩ G′ = ∅. Obviously,
the requirements of (s, t;w)-UIBFs are stronger than that of t-CFFs, but still weaker
than that of t-IPPSs.
In summary, the security properties of schemes, based on the above four kinds
of combinatorial structures, have a relationship as
t-TSs > t-IPPSs > (s, t;w)-UIBFs > t-CFFs,
where “>” means “stronger”. On the one hand, as can be seen, a t-TS has the
strongest security property that for any t-collusion, at least one traitor can be traced
back in time O(M), where M is the number of users in this scheme. A t-CFF only
guarantee that any innocent user cannot be framed by any t-collusion, but can
not provide the ability of tracing back to traitors. On the other hand, the scheme
based on a t-CFF can accommodate the most users among them, and a t-TS has a
capacity much less than a t-CFF. Therefore, to find a tradeoff between the security
property and the capacity of users for a key-distribution scheme is an interesting and
meaningful problem. In some sense, t-IPPSs and (s, t;w)-UIBFs are two structures
on the way of finding a balance between t-TSs and t-CFFs.
This dissertation is devoted to investigate these four kinds of schemes from the
combinatorial viewpoint. We aim to determine the maximum capacity of each
scheme, and to construct the schemes which could accommodate the maximum
numbers of users.
1.2 Multimedia fingerprinting
In Section 1.1, the anti-collusion key-distribution schemes in broadcast encryption
were required to resist the illegal key redistribution. In this section, we discuss the
anti-collusion codes for multimedia fingerprinting, which are required to resist the
illegal content redistribution.
Multimedia fingerprinting is a technology of protecting the copyright of mul-
timedia content, such as audio, video, images, text, and various other modalities.
Fingerprints for multimedia data can be embedded through a variety of watermark-
ing techniques prior to their authorized distribution, among which spread-spectrum
additive embedding is a widely employed robust embedding technique [27, 70]. As
depicted in [24], in spread-spectrum embedding, a watermark signal, often repre-
sented by noise-like orthonormal basis signals, is added to the host signal. Usually,
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all signals are regarded as vectors in some signal spaces. Let x be the host multi-
media signal, {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be an orthonormal basis of noise-like signals, and
let
{fj = (fj(1), fj(2), . . . , fj(n)) =
n∑
i=1
bijei : 1 ≤ j ≤M}, bij ∈ {0, 1}
be a family of scaled watermarks to achieve the imperceptibility as well as to control
the energy of the embedded watermark. The watermarked version of the content
yj = x+fj , 1 ≤ j ≤M , is then assigned to the authorized user Uj who has purchased
the rights to access x. The fingerprint fj assigned to Uj can be represented uniquely
by a vector bj = (b1j , b2j , . . . , bnj)T ∈ {0, 1}n according to the linear independence
of the basis {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Clearly, an individual authorized user will not
redistribute his/her received content without running the risk of being tracked down.
However, several authorized users may collude to generate a pirate copy by virtue
of some collusion attack models so that the venture traced by the pirate copy can
be attenuated. For more details about the collusion attack models, the interested
reader is referred to [67].
A coalition is a group U = {Uj1 , Uj2 , . . . , Ujt} of authorized users who intend to
work together to generate a pirate copy, where each authorized user Ujk is dishonest
and called a traitor. By the above assumptions, each authorized user Ujk , 1 ≤ k ≤ t,
is assigned the content yjk = x+fjk , where fjk =
∑n
i=1 bijkei and bijk ∈ {0, 1}. As in
[24], we assume that they have no way of manipulating the individual orthonormal
signals, that is, the underlying codeword needs to be taken and proceeded as a
single entity. Normally, no colluder is willing to take more of a risk than any other
colluder. As claimed in [67, 91], the averaging attack is the most fair choice for
each colluder to take the risk of being identified. This attack also makes the pirate
copy have better perceptional quality. Accordingly, a pirate copy y produced by an
averaging attack of U is
y =
t∑
k=1
1
t
yjk = x+
1
t
t∑
k=1
fjk = x+
t∑
k=1
n∑
i=1
bijk
t
ei. (1.1)
The pirate copy y is also called a descendant of U , and each user in U is called a
parent of y. One important problem in multimedia fingerprinting is how to detect
colluders in U once a pirate copy y is confiscated.
In colluder detection phases, the distributor can extract the mixed fingerprints
information from y by computing the correlation vectorT = (T(1),T(2), . . . ,T(n))T ,
where T(i) = 〈y−x, ei〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and 〈y−x, ei〉 is the inner product of y−x and
ei. Obviously, 0 ≤ T(i) ≤ 1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Now the traitor tracing problem is
how to identify the colluders from the detection statistics of their mixed fingerprints
information. The interested reader is referred to [24, 67] for more details.
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A multimedia t-fingerprinting code is a set of authorized fingerprints, each of
which is assigned to an authorized user, such that no matter which coalition of at
most t traitors collude to produce a pirate copy, the distributor is always capable of
tracing back to at least one or all colluders. Thus the main problems in multimedia
fingerprinting are 1) to design a t-fingerprinting code with as large code size as
possible, which corresponds to accommodate as many users as possible; and 2) to
create as efficient as possible traitor tracing algorithms for the t-fingerprinting code
to identify at least one or all colluders from a captured pirate copy.
In the following, we briefly recap two kinds of anti-collusion codes for multimedia
fingerprinting.
 Separable codes
Separable codes were introduced by Cheng and Miao in [24] and further studied
in [16, 23, 21, 47] and so on. In the linear attack model, a t-separable code guar-
antees that any two distinct groups, where each group consists of up to t users, can
not generate the same pirate copy. Thus, once a pirate copy generated by at most
t colluders is confiscated, the coalition set can be identified by checking all group-
s of up to t users. Obviously, the traitor tracing algorithm is not efficient, since
its computational complexity is O(M t), where M is the number of all authorized
users. Furthermore, Cheng and Miao [24] found that the binary frameproof codes,
introduced in [19] for digital fingerprinting, can provide more efficient traitor tracing
algorithm for multimedia contents with the computational complexity O(M), where-
as the frameproof codes do not have traceability in digital fingerprinting. However,
the frameproof codes have a smaller capacity than separable codes. In [56], Jiang
et al. introduced the concept of strongly separable codes, which is a special kind
of separable codes. They showed that the strongly separable codes have the traitor
tracing algorithm to identify all colluders with computational complexity O(M),
and also a larger capacity than frameproof codes. To some extent, the strongly
separable codes lie between frameproof codes and separable codes.
 Multimedia parent-identifying codes
Parent-identifying codes were introduced by Hollmann et al. [53] for digital
fingerprinting to guarantee that at least one colluder can be traced back by virtue
of some traitor tracing algorithms. As an analogue of that, Cheng et al. [22]
proposed codes with the identifiable parent property for multimedia fingerprinting,
which are also referred to as the multimedia parent-identifying codes (MIPPCs).
They showed that, in a linear attack, t-MIPPCs ensure that at least one colluder
can be identified by a tracing algorithm with computational complexity O(M t) by
computing the intersection of all groups of up to t possible parents who can produce
the pirate copy. Compared to separable codes, although MIPPCs can only identify
8
at least one colluder, Cheng et al. [22] conjectured MIPPCs can have much more
codewords than separable codes, and they proved this for several small parameters.
This dissertation is also devoted to investigate the maximum number of code-
words in the multimedia anti-collusion codes.
1.3 Previous results
Among the known results on t-TS, Stinson and Wei [85] proved that a t-TS is a
t-CFF, and derived an upper bound for the number of blocks in a t-TS by using this
relationship. There is a huge gap between this upper bound and the lower bound
determined by the size of t-TS constructed by using combinatorial structures in [85].
Collins [29] improved the upper bound for t-TS, and gave upper bounds for t-IPPS.
Unfortunately, there is no construction which can achieve any of these known upper
bounds. As a matter of fact, the known upper bounds for t-TS and t-IPPS are not
tight.
Cheng et al. [22] derived upper bounds for MIPPCs by transferring the require-
ment of a t-MIPPC to a corresponding bipartite graph without cycles of length less
than or equal to 2t. They also gave some constructions for 3-MIPPCs of length 2
by means of generalized quadrangles. However, there are no general lower bounds
or constructions for t-MIPPCs.
1.4 Contributions
This dissertation is devoted to study the anti-collusion schemes for broadcast encryp-
tion and the anti-collusion codes for multimedia fingerprinting by virtue of combi-
natorial methods, such as techniques in extremal set theory, extremal graph theory,
probabilistic methods and combinatorial design theory. We derive new bounds for
the anti-collusion combinatorial structures and also provide constructions to achieve
our new bounds, which greatly improve the previously known results and further
promote the development of broadcast encryption and multimedia fingerprinting.
To be specific, we state our results in the following aspects.
As far as we know, in the literature, the relationship between TS and CFF
has been studied for the same strength (i.e. a t-TS is a t-CFF), and this is also
almost true for other relationships among various anti-collusion schemes. In this
dissertation, we find a very interesting phenomenon, that is, a t-TS is in fact a
t2-CFF. This is the first relationship between two kinds of anti-collusion schemes
which strengthens the strength from t to t2. Based on this important discovery,
new upper bounds for t-TS are derived. To obtain our new bounds, we use a
combinatorial structure called own-subset by Erdős, Frankl and Füredi in [39]. Our
new bounds show that some infinite families of t-TSs constructed by Stinson and
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Wei [85] from combinatorial designs are in fact optimal. We generalize Stinson and
Wei’s construction to obtain more infinite families of optimal t-TS. We also describe
a constructive lower bound for general t-TS, the size of which has the same order of
magnitude as the new upper bounds. These results are exhibited in Chapter 4.
Collins [29] showed that the upper bound for t-IPPS(w, v) is O(vd
w
bt2/4c+dt/2e e).
We give an improvement for this by showing that the upper bound for t-IPPS(w, v)
is O(vd
w
bt2/4c+t e), which is realized by analyzing the minimum size of own-subsets
possessed by some blocks in a t-IPPS. Next, by using the expurgation method, we
prove that for fixed t, w and sufficiently large v, there exists a t-IPPS(w, v) with
size O(v
w
bt2/4c+t ), which has the same order of magnitude with the new upper bound
when bt2/4c + t is a divisor of w. We also study 2-IPPS(w, v) for small w. Better
upper bounds for 2-IPPS(4, v) and 3-IPPS(6, v) are respectively derived by means
of the well-known graph removal lemma in extremal graph theory. These results are
presented in Chapter 5.
We introduce a special kind of CFF, called UIBF, due to its applications in
broadcast encryption. The relationships among UIBF, TS, IPPS and CFF are in-
vestigated in Chapter 3. The upper bounds and lower bounds for UIBF are provided
in Chapter 6, which have the same order of magnitude for certain cases.
The probabilistic existence result for MIPPCs is presented in Chapter 7, which
is the first lower bound for general MIPPCs. We also compare the new lower bound
with the known upper bound for MIPPCs, showing that the gap between them is
very small.
Partial results of this dissertation have been preprinted for publication in [50,
51, 52].
1.5 Outline of this dissertation
In Chapter 2, we recap some basic notations and definitions. The definitions of TS,
IPPS, UIBF, CFF, and their relationships are presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter
4, we provide the new upper bounds, new lower bounds and several constructions
for TS. New bounds for IPPS and UIBF are exhibited in Chapter 5 and Chapter
6, respectively. In Chapter 7, we show the probabilistic existence result for MIP-
PC. Finally, we conclude this dissertation and list several related open problems in
Chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Preliminary
In this chapter, we state some mathematical notations and concepts which will be
used in this dissertation.
2.1 Set systems
Let v and w be positive integers such that v ≥ w. Suppose X is a finite set of size v,
then denote 2X as the power set of X which consists of all subsets of X , and denote(X
w
)
as the collection of all w-subsets of X , that is,(X
w
)
= {B ∈ 2X : |B| = w}.
Definition 2.1.1 A set system is a pair (X ,B), where B ⊆ 2X . The cardinality of
B is called the size of the set system (X ,B). The elements of X are called points
and the members of B are called blocks.
Example 2.1.2 Suppose X = {1, 2, 3, 4} and B = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}, {2, 3, 4}}. Then
(X ,B) is a set system with size |B| = 4.
Definition 2.1.3 A set system (X ,B) is w-uniform if B ⊆ (Xw). A set system
(X ,B) is called uniform if it is w-uniform for some positive integer w ≤ v.
A w-uniform set system (X ,B) is also denoted as a (w, v) set system. The
following notion of sunflowers, or ∆-systems, was introduced by Erdős and Rado
[40] in 1960.
Definition 2.1.4 Let (X ,B) be a set system. Then (X ,B) is a sunflower or ∆-
system if there exists a subset (core) ∆ ⊆ X such that
(1) for any two distinct blocks A,B ∈ B, we have A ∩B = ∆;
(2) for any block B ∈ B, the petal B \∆ is nonempty.
Note that a family of pairwise disjoint sets is a sunflower (with an empty core).
Figure 2.1: A depiction of sunflower B in Example 2.1.5
Example 2.1.5 Suppose X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and B = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5},
{1, 2, 6}}. Let ∆ = {1, 2} ⊆ X . Clearly, the intersection of any two blocks in B is
∆, and B \∆ is nonempty for any B ∈ B. Thus B is a sunflower. A direct depiction
of this sunflower is as Figure 2.1.
A notion, the own-subset, is extremely useful in deriving bounds for the size of
set systems t-CFF in [39]. It is also an important tool we will exploit to investigate
the combinatorial schemes in broadcast encryption.
Definition 2.1.6 Let (X ,B) be a set system and B ∈ B be a block. Then a subset
B0 ⊆ B is called a |B0|-own-subset of B if B0 * B′ for any B′ ∈ B \ {B}.
In the above Example 2.1.5, we can see that {3} is a 1-own-subset of {1, 2, 3},
{1, 6} is a 2-own-subset of {1, 2, 6}, and {2, 4, 5} is a 3-own-subset of {1, 2, 4, 5}.
But {1, 2} is not a 2-own-subset of any block in B.
2.2 Graphs
Definition 2.2.1 A graph G is a pair (V,E) comprising a set V of vertices together
with a set E of edges, where E ⊆ (V2).
A graph defined by Definition 2.2.1 is usually described as undirected and simple.
As can be seen, a graph G = (V,E) corresponds to a 2-uniform set system (X ,B),
where X = V and B = E. Generally, set systems are also investigated in the disguise
of hypergraphs.
Definition 2.2.2 A hypergraph H is a pair (V, E), where V is a set of elements
called vertices and E is a set of non-empty subsets of V called edges or hyperedges.
A hypergraph H = (V, E) is called k-uniform if for any E ∈ E, |E| = k.
A 2-uniform hypergraph is a graph. A (k-uniform) set system (X ,B) such that
∅ /∈ B corresponds to a (k-uniform) hypergraph H = (V, E), where V = X and
E = B.
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Definition 2.2.3 A graph G = (V,E) is complete if E =
(
V
2
)
. A complete graph
on n vertices is denoted by Kn.
Definition 2.2.4 Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A graph G′ = (V ′, E′) is a subgraph
of G = (V,E) if V ′ ⊆ V , E′ ⊆ E and E′ ⊆ (V ′2 ).
Definition 2.2.5 A path is a graph P = (V,E) of the form
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vl}, E = {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, . . . , {vl−1, vl}},
where vi are all distinct. The cardinality of E is called the length of the path P .
Definition 2.2.6 Adding an edge {vl, v1} to a path P = (V,E) forms a cycle. The
number of edges in a cycle is called the length of the cycle. The length of a shortest
cycle contained in a graph is called the girth of the graph.
Example 2.2.7 Figure 2.2 depicts a graph G = (V,E), where V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and
E = {{1, 2}, {1, 4}, {3, 4}, {3, 5}, {4, 5}}. A subgraph P = ({1, 2, 4}, {{1, 2}, {1, 4}})
of G is a path of length 2. A subgraph K = ({3, 4, 5}, {{3, 4}, {3, 5}, {4, 5}}) of G is
a cycle of length 3 and also a complete graph on {3, 4, 5}. The girth of graph G is
3.
Figure 2.2: An example of graph in Example 2.2.7
Lemma 2.2.8 ([32]) If a graph G on an n-vertex set contains more than n − 1
edges, then G contains a cycle.
A well-known result in extremal graph theory, the graph removal lemma, was
first stated by Alon, Duke, Lefmann, Rödl and Yuster in [3] and Füredi in [45], which
is a generalization of the triangle removal lemma proved by Ruzsa and Szemerédi
in [88]. A recent survey of graph removal lemma refers to [30].
Lemma 2.2.9 ([3, 30, 45]) For any graph H and any ε > 0, there exists δ > 0
such that any graph on n vertices which contains at most δnv(H) copies of H may be
made H-free by removing at most εn2 edges, where v(H) is the number of vertices
in graph H.
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2.3 Combinatorial designs
Definition 2.3.1 A t-(v, k, λ) design, a t-design in short, is a k-uniform set system
(X ,B) with the property that every t-subset of X is contained in exactly λ blocks.
Example 2.3.2 A 2-(7, 3, 1) design (X ,B), also known as Fano plane, is shown in
Figure 2.3, where X = {1, 2, . . . , 7} and B = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 4, 7}, {1, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 6}, {2, 5,
7}, {3, 4, 5}, {3, 6, 7}}.
Figure 2.3: The Fano plane
Definition 2.3.3 A t-(v, k, λ) packing, a t-packing in short, is a k-uniform set
system (X ,B) with the property that every t-subset of X is contained in at most λ
blocks.
In Example 2.3.2, one can get a 2-(7, 3, 1) packing by deleting some blocks from
B.
Proposition 2.3.4 Let (X ,B) be a t-(v, k, λ) design. Then
|B| = λ
(
v
t
)(
k
t
) .
Corollary 2.3.5 Let (X ,B) be a t-(v, k, λ) packing. Then
|B| ≤ λ
(
v
t
)(
k
t
) .
The following are two notable results on designs and packings.
In 2014, Keevash [62] proved the existence conjecture of τ -design by using the
method of randomised algebraic constructions. More recently, Glock, Kühn, Lo and
Osthus [49] provided a new proof for that via iterative absorption. The case τ = 2
was also proved by Wilson four decades ago [28].
Theorem 2.3.6 ([62, 49]) Given w, τ and λ, there exists a v0(w, τ, λ) such that
for any v > v0(w, τ, λ), a τ -(v, w, λ) design exists if and only if for any 0 ≤ i ≤ τ−1,
λ
(
v − i
τ − i
)
≡ 0 (mod
(
w − i
τ − i
)
).
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The asymptotic existence of τ -(v, w, 1) packing was proved by Rödl by using the
probabilistic method known as the Rödl nibble [72].
Theorem 2.3.7 ([72]) Given w and τ , there exists a v0(w, τ) such that for any
v > v0(w, τ), a τ -(v, w, 1) packing (X ,B) exists with size |B| = (1− o(1))
(
v
τ
)
/
(
w
τ
)
.
2.4 Coding theory
Let n, q be positive integers and Q be a finite set with size q. Usually, Q = {0,
1, . . . , q − 1}.
Definition 2.4.1 A set C ⊆ Qn is called a q-ary code of length n, denoted (n, q)
code. Each c ∈ C is called a codeword. The cardinality of C is called the code size.
If q = 2, we also refer to C as a binary code.
Definition 2.4.2 The Hamming distance between two codewords u = (u(1), . . . ,u(n))
and v = (v(1), . . . ,v(n)) is
d(u,v) = |{1 ≤ i ≤ n : u(i) 6= v(i)}|.
Definition 2.4.3 The Hamming weight of a codeword c = {c(1), . . . , c(n)} ∈ Qn
is
wt(c) = d(c,0) = |{1 ≤ i ≤ n : c(i) 6= 0}|,
where 0 = (0, . . . , 0). A code C is called a constant weight code if there exists a
constant 0 ≤ w ≤ n such that for any codeword c ∈ C, wt(c) = w.
Example 2.4.4 Let Q = {0, 1} and C = {1100, 1010, 1001, 0110, 0101, 0011}. Then
C is a binary code of length 4 and size 6. It is also a constant weight code, since for
any c ∈ C, we have wt(c) = 2.
An important parameter in coding theory is the rate of a code, which is defined
as follows.
Definition 2.4.5 The code rate of an (n, q) code C is
R(C) = logq |C|
n
.
The asymptotic code rate of C is often investigated for a certain class of codes.
That is,
lim
n→∞R(C) = limn→∞
logq |C|
n
or
lim
q→∞R(C) = limq→∞
logq |C|
n
.
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2.5 Probabilistic methods
We first state some basic concepts in probability theory. Here and hereafter we
consider Ω to be a discrete set.
Definition 2.5.1 The sample space is a set Ω containing all possible outcomes.
Definition 2.5.2 An event is a subset of the sample space Ω. The event space F
is the collection of all events in the sample space Ω.
Definition 2.5.3 A probability space is a three-tuple (Ω,F , P ), where Ω is the sam-
ple space, F is the event space and P is a function from events to probabilities.
Definition 2.5.4 Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space. A discrete random variable
X : Ω→ R is a real-valued function from Ω to the measurable space R.
Denote RX as the set of all possible values of the random variable X.
Definition 2.5.5 Let X be a discrete random variable. The probability mass func-
tion of X is a function
p(x) = P (X = x), ∀x ∈ RX ,
such that
(1) p(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ RX ;
(2)
∑
x∈RX p(x) = 1;
(3) P (X ∈ A) = ∑x∈A p(x), ∀A ⊆ RX .
Example 2.5.6 When a single 6-sided die is tossed, the sample space is Ω =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The probability of each outcome is P (i) = 1/6, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ 6.
A discrete random variable X : Ω→ R is defined as X(i) = bi/2c, ∀ i ∈ Ω. The
set of all possible values of X is RX = {0, 1, 2, 3}. The probability mass function
p(x) of X is
p(0) = P (X = 0) = P (1) =
1
6
,
p(1) = P (X = 1) = P (2) + P (3) =
1
3
,
p(2) = P (X = 2) = P (4) + P (5) =
1
3
,
p(3) = P (X = 3) = P (6) =
1
6
.
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Definition 2.5.7 Let X be a discrete random variable and p(x) be the probability
mass function of X. The expected value (or expectation) of X is
E(X) =
∑
x∈RX
xp(x).
In Example 2.5.6, we have
E(X) = 0 · p(0) + 1 · p(1) + 2 · p(2) + 3 · p(3) = 0 + 1
3
+
2
3
+
3
6
=
3
2
.
The linearity of expectations is stated as follows.
Proposition 2.5.8 ([5]) Let X1, . . . , Xn be random variables, X = c1X1 + · · · +
cnXn. Linearity of expectation states that
E(X) = c1E(X1) + · · ·+ cnE(Xn).
As depicted in [58], the power of this principle comes from there being no re-
strictions on the dependence or independence of the Xi’s. In most arguments, we
often use the following fact, known as the Pigeonhole principle.
Proposition 2.5.9 There must be a point in the probability space for which X ≥
E(X) and a point for which X ≤ E(X).
Probabilistic methods provide tools to argue that some structures with certain
properties do exist. By the basic probabilistic methods, one defines an appropriate
probability space of structures and then proves that the desired properties hold in
this space with positive probability [5].
However, the expurgation method can work beyond this. Expurgation method,
also called the alteration method or deletion method, deals with the situation that
the random structure does not have all the desired properties but may have a few
“blemishes”. And the desired structure can be shown to exist after removing the
blemishes [5, 58].
2.6 Secret sharing schemes
Secret sharing schemes are important tools in cryptography. A secret-sharing scheme
refers to a method by which a dealer distributes a secret amongst a group of players,
each of whom is allocated a share of the secret, such that
(1) any subset in A can reconstruct the secret from its shares;
(2) any subset not in A can not reveal any partial information on the secret,
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where A is a collection of subsets of shares, called the access structure. Usually,
individual shares are of no use on their own.
Shamir [75] and Blakley [18] introduced the threshold secret sharing schemes,
that is, the secret can be reconstructed only when a sufficient number of shares are
combined together.
Definition 2.6.1 Let n and k be positive integers such that n ≥ k. A (k, n)-
threshold scheme, also called a k out of n threshold scheme, is a method of sharing
a secret amongst a set of n parties in such a way that
(1) any k or more shares (parties) can reconstruct the secret;
(2) any k − 1 or fewer shares (parties) can not reconstruct the secret.
The essential idea of the Shamir threshold scheme is that k points are sufficient
to define a polynomial of degree k − 1.
Example 2.6.2 Suppose the dealer would like to use a (k, n)-threshold secret shar-
ing scheme to share a secret S. First, the secret is assumed to be an element a0
in a finite field Fq, where q is a prime power such that q > n. The dealer chooses
k − 1 random elements a1, . . . , ak−1 ∈ Fq independently with uniform distribution,
and builds a polynomial
f(x) = a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ ak−1xk−1.
Let α1, . . . , αn ∈ Fq be n distinct nonzero elements. Each party i is assigned a point
(αi, f(αi)), which is also called a share. Then any k shares can compute the constant
term a0 by using the polynomial interpolation.
For more details on the secret sharing schemes, the interested reader is referred
to a survey [11] and the references therein.
2.7 Group testing
The field of group testing was introduced by Dorfman [33] in 1943. The motivation
arose during the Second World War when the United States public health service and
the selective service embarked upon a large scale project to weed out all syphilitic
men called up for induction. However, at that time, testing every soldier individually
was expensive and inefficient. Group testing provides an efficient way:
(a) pool soldiers into groups, and combine blood samples in each group together;
(b) test the combined sample to check if at least one soldier in the group has
syphilis.
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Accordingly, the two important problems in group testing are how to design the
experiment groups and how to identify the syphilitic soldiers from the testing re-
sults. Recently, group testing is also found applications in molecular biology, drug
discovery, information security and so on.
In the literature, many combinatorial structures were proposed for group testing.
We list some of them as follows.
Definition 2.7.1 Let n be a positive integer. A family F ⊆ 2[n] is t-cover-free, if
for any t+ 1 distinct blocks A0, A1, . . . , At ∈ F , we have
A0 *
⋃
1≤i≤t
Ai.
The incidence matrix of t-cover-free family is also called t-disjunct matrix.
Definition 2.7.2 Let n be a positive integer. A family F ⊆ 2[n] is t-superimposed
if for any distinct subfamilies F1,F2 ⊆ F such that F1 6= F2 and 1 ≤ |Fi| ≤ t,
i = 1, 2, we have ⋃
A∈F1
A 6=
⋃
A∈F2
A
The incidence matrix of t-superimposed family is also called t-separable matrix.
Definition 2.7.3 Let n be a positive integer. A family F ⊆ 2[n] is t-single-user
tracing superimposed family, if for all choices of F1, . . . ,Fk with 1 ≤ |Fi| ≤ t,⋃
A∈F1
A =
⋃
A∈F2
A = · · · =
⋃
A∈Fk
A
implies ⋂
1≤i≤k
Fi 6= ∅.
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Chapter 3
Combinatorial Schemes for
Broadcast Encryption
In this chapter, we first present the combinatorial definitions of TS, IPPS, UIBF,
CFF, and their corresponding applications in broadcast encryption. Their relation-
ships are also described in Section 3.2.
3.1 Definitions
First, we state the definitions of TS, IPPS, UIBF and CFF from the combinatorial
viewpoint as follows.
Definition 3.1.1 Suppose (X ,B) is a (w, v) set system with size |B| = M . Let
s, t, d be positive integers such that s ≤ t and d ≤ w. Then
(1) (X ,B) is a t-traceability scheme, denoted t-TS(w,M, v), provided that for every
choice of s ≤ t blocks B1, B2, . . . , Bs ∈ B and for any w-subset T ⊆
⋃
1≤j≤sBj,
there does not exist a block B ∈ B\{B1, B2, . . . , Bs} such that |T∩B| ≥ |T∩Bj |
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ s.
(2) (X ,B) is a t-parent-identifying set system, denoted t-IPPS(w,M, v), provided
that for any w-subset T ⊆ X , either Pt(T ) is empty, or⋂
P∈Pt(T )
P 6= ∅,
where
Pt(T ) := {P ⊆ B : |P| ≤ t, T ⊆
⋃
B∈P
B}.
(3) (X ,B) is an (s, t; d)-union-intersection-bounded family, denoted (s, t; d)-UIBF(w,
M, v), provided that for any s + t distinct blocks A1, . . . , As, B1, . . . , Bt ∈ B,
we have
|(
⋃
1≤i≤s
Ai) ∩ (
⋃
1≤j≤t
Bj)| < d.
(4) (X ,B) is a t-cover-free family, denoted t-CFF(w,M, v), provided that for any
t+ 1 distinct blocks B0, B1, . . . , Bt ∈ B, we have
B0 *
⋃
1≤i≤t
Bi.
Example 3.1.2 Let X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and B = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}. By
Definition 2.1.4, (X ,B) is a sunflower. It is easy to check that (X ,B) is a 2-TS(3, 5),
a 2-IPPS(3, 5), a (2, 2; 3)-UIBF(3, 5) and a 2-CFF(3, 5).
In the setting of applications of Definition 3.1.1 (1)–(4), X corresponds to the
set of base keys possessed by the data supplier, and each block B ∈ B corresponds
to a personal key issued to an authorized user. Accordingly, the cardinality of B, i.e.
the parameterM , is the number of users which the scheme can accommodate. A set
of traitors holding B0 ⊆ B, where |B0| ≤ t, as their personal keys can combine their
personal keys to produce a pirate personal key, that is, a w-subset T ⊆ ⋃B∈B0 B,
to decode w shares of the key K, then use the w out of v threshold secret sharing
scheme to recover K, and finally use K to decrypt the data block. The subset T
is called a descendant generated by B0, while B0 is referred to as a parent set of T ,
and each B ∈ B0 is called a parent of T . Note that the parent sets are not in general
unique [14]. Explicitly, the notation Pt(T ) in the above definition is the set of all
parent sets of T with size at most t. We also refer to
Desct(B) := {T ⊆ X : Pt(T ) 6= ∅, |T | = w}
as the set of descendants of B.
Example 3.1.3 Let X = {1, 2, . . . , 6} and B = {B1 = {1, 2, 3}, B2 = {2, 4, 5}, B3 =
{3, 5, 6}}. If T = {3, 4, 5}, then
T ⊆ B1 ∪B2 and T ⊆ B2 ∪B3.
T is a descendant of {B1, B2} (also {B2, B3}). Both {B1, B2} and {B2, B3} are
parent sets of T with size 2, which implies
P2(T ) = {{B1, B2}, {B2, B3}}.
The set of descendants of B is
Desc2(B) =
(X
3
)
− {{1, 4, 6}} =
({1, . . . , 6}
3
)
− {{1, 4, 6}}.
When a pirate decoder T ∈ Desct(B) is confiscated, the data supplier wishes to
identify at least one parent of T . The traitor tracing algorithm based on a t-TS,
Definition 3.1.1 (1), allows a traitor to be identified in time O(M) by exploiting
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the property that any user with the maximum number of base keys in common
with the pirate T has to be a traitor [14]. t-IPPSs can be applied to trace back
to at least one traitor in the intersection of all possible parents sets of T , which is
not empty according to Definition 3.1.1 (2). Clearly, the traitor tracing algorithm
based on a t-IPPS needs to check each subset of B with size at most t, resulting in
time O(M t). As can be seen, both t-IPPS and t-TS can be used in traitor tracing
schemes to trace back to at least one traitor, but the latter can accommodate more
users, while the former is more efficient. Unfortunately, (s, t;w)-UIBFs and t-CFFs
can not satisfy this requirement of tracing back to traitors. In some sense, they can
provide some weaker security properties as follows. The scheme based on (s, t;w)-
UIBF guarantees that any group G ⊆ B of up to s traitors can not frame any other
group G′ ⊆ F of up to t users provided that G ∩ G′ = ∅, since the intersection of
G and G′ contains less than w base keys in accordance with Definition 3.1.1 (3).
Moreover, (t, t;w)-UIBFs can provide a sort of weak traceability. That is, once
a pirate T ∈ Desct(B) is captured, a (t, t;w)-UIBF guarantees that each possible
parent set of size at most t, which can generate the pirate copy T , must contain at
least one traitor. Chor et al. [25, 26] applied t-CFFs in the traitor tracing scheme
setting to ensure that any t users can not frame any innocent authorized user, for
the reason that any innocent user has at least one base key not known to the traitors
according to Definition 3.1.1 (4).
The parameter M is called the size of the set system. We also use t-TS(w, v)
(t-IPPS(w, v), (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v), t-CFF(w, v), resp.) to replace t-TS(w,M, v) (t-
IPPS(w,M, v), (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v), t-CFF(w,M, v), resp.) when M is unclear or
not necessarily claimed.
• Denote Mt(w, v) as the maximum size of a t-TS(w, v). A t-TS(w, v) is called
optimal if it has size Mt(w, v). Given parameters t, w and v, the goal is to
explore the exact value of Mt(w, v) and to construct optimal t-TS(w, v).
• Denote It(w, v) as the maximum size of a t-IPPS(w, v). A t-IPPS(w, v) is
called optimal if it has size It(w, v). Given parameters t, w and v, the goal is
to explore the exact value of It(w, v) and to construct optimal t-IPPS(w, v).
• Denote Us,t(w, v; d) as the maximum size of an (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v). An (s, t; d)-
UIBF(w, v) is called optimal if it has size Us,t(w, v; d). Given parameters
s, t, d, w and v, the goal is to explore the exact value of Us,t(w, v; d) and to
construct optimal (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v).
• Denote ft(w, v) as the maximum size of a t-CFF(w, v). A t-CFF(w, v) is
called optimal if it has size ft(w, v). Given parameters t, w and v, the goal is
to explore the exact value of ft(w, v) and to construct optimal t-CFF(w, v).
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The research problems which are commonly considered for TS, IPPS and CFF
are
• to derive (tight) upper and lower bounds on the maximum size of the desired
set systems;
• to give constructions for the desired set systems with size as large as possible,
especially with size achieving their upper bounds.
In this thesis, we are also concerned with the above types of problems for TS, IPPS,
UIBF and CFF.
3.2 Relationships
The relationships among TS, IPPS and CFF have been studied in [85] and [29].
To be self-contained, we show the arguments of all relationships among TS, IPPS,
UIBF and CFF in Lemma 3.2.1.
Lemma 3.2.1 Let v, w, t be positive integers such that v ≥ w ≥ 2 and t ≥ 2. Then
(1) [29] A t-TS(w, v) is a t-IPPS(w, v).
(2) A t-IPPS(w, v) is a (t, t;w)-UIBF(w, v).
(3) A (t, t;w)-UIBF(w, v) is a t-CFF(w, v).
Proof: (1) Suppose (X ,B) is a t-TS(w, v), then we would like to prove it is also
a t-IPPS(w, v). Let T ⊆ X be a w-subset such that Pt(T ) 6= ∅. Since (X ,B) is a
t-TS(w, v) and each P ∈ Pt(T ) can generate T , we have
{B′ ∈ B : |T ∩B′| = max
B∈B
|T ∩B|} ⊆ P
for any P ∈ Pt(T ). It implies that
{B′ ∈ B : |T ∩B′| = max
B∈B
|T ∩B|} ⊆
⋂
P∈Pt(T )
P 6= ∅.
By Definition 3.1.1 (2), (X ,B) is a t-IPPS(w, v).
(2) Suppose (X ,B) is not a (t, t;w)-UIBF(w, v), then we would like to prove it is
not a t-IPPS(w, v). By the definition of (t, t;w)-UIBF(w, v), there exist B1,B2 ⊆ B
such that |B1| = t, |B2| = t, B1 ∩ B2 = ∅ and
|(
⋃
B∈B1
B) ∩ (
⋃
B∈B2
B)| ≥ w.
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Let T be a w-subset of (
⋃
B∈B1 B) ∩ (
⋃
B∈B2 B). Then B1,B2 ∈ Pt(T ). However,
B1 ∩ B2 = ∅ implies that
⋂
P∈Pt(T ) P = ∅. By Definition 3.1.1 (2), (X ,B) is not a
t-IPPS(w, v).
(3) Suppose (X ,B) is not a t-CFF(w, v), then we would like to prove it is not
a (t, t;w)-UIBF(w, v). By the definition of t-CFF(w, v), there exist t + 1 blocks
B1, . . . , Bt+1 ∈ B such that Bt+1 ⊆
⋃
1≤i≤tBi. Arbitrarily choose other t− 1 blocks
Bt+2, . . . , B2t ∈ B \ {B1, . . . , Bt+1}, we have
|(
⋃
1≤i≤t
Bi) ∩ (
⋃
t+1≤j≤2t
Bj)| ≥ |(
⋃
1≤i≤t
Bi) ∩Bt+1| = w.
By Definition 3.1.1 (3), (X ,B) is not a (t, t;w)-UIBF(w, v). 
The relationship between TS and CFF was investigated in [85]. That is, a t-TS is
a t-CFF, which follows from Lemma 3.2.1 (1), (2) and (3). The relationship between
IPPS and CFF was shown in [29]. That is, a t-IPPS is a t-CFF, which follows from
Lemma 3.2.1 (2) and (3). In other words, t-TS is a special kind of t-IPPS, t-IPPS
is a special kind of (t, t;w)-UIBF(w, v), and (t, t;w)-UIBF(w, v) is a special kind of
t-CFF. In the following, we give some examples to certify this relationship.
Example 3.2.2 (A t-IPPS may not be a t-TS.)
Let X = {1, . . . , 9} and B = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 5}, {6, 7, 8, 9}}. Then (X ,B) is
a 2-IPPS(4, 9) but not a 2-TS(4, 9).
Indeed, for any 4-subset T ⊆ X which can be generated by two blocks in B, T
must contain at least one element of {4, . . . , 9}. Since each element of {4, . . . , 9}
determines one block, by Definition 3.1.1 (2), (X ,B) is a 2-IPPS(4, 9).
However, {1, 2, 3, 4} and {6, 7, 8, 9} can generate a 4-subset T = {1, 2, 3, 9}, but
|{1, 2, 3, 9} ∩ {1, 2, 3, 4}| = 3,
|{1, 2, 3, 9} ∩ {1, 2, 3, 5}| = 3,
|{1, 2, 3, 9} ∩ {6, 7, 8, 9}| = 1,
which contradicts Definition 3.1.1 (1) and implies (X ,B) is not a 2-TS(4, 9).
Example 3.2.3 (A (t, t;w)-UIBF may not be a t-IPPS.)
Let X = {1, . . . , 9} and B = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 6}, {7, 8, 9}}. Then (X ,B)
is a (2, 2; 3)-UIBF(3, 9) but not a 2-IPPS(3, 9).
In fact, when we divide the four blocks in B into two disjoint groups of size 2, it
is equivalent to take two blocks from {1, 2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 6}. One case is
|({1, 2, 3} ∪ {1, 4, 5}) ∩ ({3, 4, 6} ∪ {7, 8, 9})| = |{3, 4}| = 2 < 3.
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It is easy to check that in the two other cases, the intersection is also 2. By Definition
3.1.1 (3), (X ,B) is a (2, 2; 3)-UIBF(3, 9).
However, any two of {1, 2, 3}, {1, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 6} can generate the same 3-subset
T = {1, 3, 4}, which implies ⋂P∈Pt(T ) P = ∅. By Definition 3.1.1 (2), (X ,B) is not
a 2-IPPS(3, 9).
Example 3.2.4 (A t-CFF may not be a (t, t;w)-UIBF.)
Let X = {1, . . . , 9} and B = {{1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}, {5, 6, 7}, {7, 8, 9}}. Then (X ,B)
is a 2-CFF(3, 9) but not a (2, 2; 3)-UIBF(3, 9).
Indeed, since each block in B contains at least one 1-own-subset, so any block can
not be covered by other two blocks. By Definition 3.1.1 (4), (X ,B) is a 2-CFF(3, 9).
However,
|({1, 2, 3} ∪ {5, 6, 7}) ∩ ({3, 4, 5} ∪ {7, 8, 9})| = |{3, 5, 7}| = 3
implies that (X ,B) is not a (2, 2; 3)-UIBF(3, 9).
Furthermore, by Lemma 3.2.1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2.5 Let v, w, t be positive integers such that v ≥ w ≥ 2 and t ≥ 2.
Then
(1) Mt(w, v) ≤ It(w, v).
(2) It(w, v) ≤ Ut,t(w, v;w).
(3) Ut,t(w, v;w) ≤ ft(w, v).
(X ,B) lim
v→∞ logv |B| ≥ limv→∞ logv |B| ≤ shown in
t-TS(w, v) dw/t2e dw/t2e Chapter 4
t-IPPS(w, v) w/(bt2/4c+ t) dw/(bt2/4c+ t)e Chapter 5
(t, t;w)-UIBF(w, v) w/(2t− 1) dw/(2t− 1)e Chapter 6
t-CFF(w, v) dw/te dw/te Reference [39]
Table 3.1: Bounds for TS, IPPS, UIBF and CFF
Table 3.1 presents a general overview of the bounds on the size of t-TS(w, v),
t-IPPS(w, v), (t, t;w)-UIBF(w, v) and t-CFF(w, v). We draw Figure 3.1 to express
the corresponding tools used to derive bounds for TS, IPPS and UIBF.
It is noteworthy that although several similar techniques are used to derive
bounds for TS, IPPS and UIBF, their arguments are distinctive. For instance,
to improve the known upper bounds of t-TS and t-IPPS, later we will use two
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different characteristics of own-subsets: (1) the largest possible number of own-
subsets (with a fixed size) possessed by each block in B (Lemma 4.2.6), which
improves the coefficient of the upper bound of t-TS; (2) the least possible size of
an own-subset possessed by some block in B (Lemma 5.3.2), which leads to the
improvement on the order of magnitude of the upper bound of t-IPPS.
Figure 3.1: Tools for TS, IPPS and UIBF
In the following Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we will derive bounds on
the size of t-TS, t-IPPS and (s, t; d)-UIBF, respectively.
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Chapter 4
Traceability Schemes
In this chapter, we focus on the traceability schemes (TSs). First, some remarks on
the definition of TS and the related known results are stated in Section 4.1. Second,
a new and interesting relationship between TS and CFF is proved in Section 4.2.1,
New upper bounds on the size of TS are shown in Section 4.2.2 for general cases and
Section 4.2.2 for several special cases, which greatly improve the previously known
results. Third, based on the new upper bounds, we obtain optimal t-TS(w, v) from
sunflowers for the case w ≤ t2 in Section 4.3.1. Constructions of TS by means of
combinatorial designs are provided in Section 4.3.2, which also can achieve our new
upper bounds in many cases. Moreover, a constructive lower bound for general TS
is given in Section 4.3.3, which has the same order of magnitude with the new upper
bounds. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 4.4. This chapter is based on
results in [51].
4.1 Definition and known results
4.1.1 Definition
In Chapter 3.1, the definition of TS given by Stinson and Wei [85] was exposed in
Definition 3.1.1 (1). Equivalently, the definition of TS can be described as follows.
Definition 4.1.1 Let (X ,B) be a (w, v) set system. Then (X ,B) is a t-traceability
scheme, denoted t-TS(w, v), if for any s blocks B1, . . . , Bs ∈ B, s ≤ t, and any
w-subset T ⊆ ⋃1≤i≤sBi, we have
{B′ ∈ B : |T ∩B′| = max
B∈B
|T ∩B|} ⊆ {B1, B2, . . . , Bs}.
The equivalence of Definition 3.1.1 (1) and Definition 4.1.1 can be easily derived
from their descriptions. Noting that the TS defined in both Definition 3.1.1(1)
and Definition 4.1.1 requires that |T | = w. Modifying it to the case |T | ≥ w and
T ⊆ ⋃1≤i≤sBi, we have the following definition of t-TS?.
Definition 4.1.2 Let (X ,B) be a (w, v) set system. Then (X ,B) is a t-traceability
scheme?, denoted t-TS?(w, v), if for any s blocks B1, . . . , Bs ∈ B, s ≤ t, and any
subset T ⊆ ⋃1≤i≤sBi such that |T | ≥ w, we have
{B′ ∈ B : |T ∩B′| = max
B∈B
|T ∩B|} ⊆ {B1, B2, . . . , Bs}.
In the following lemma, we show that Definition 4.1.1 (also Definition 3.1.1 (1))
and Definition 4.1.2 are in fact equivalent.
Lemma 4.1.3 A set system (X ,B) is a t-TS(w, v) if and only if it is a t-TS?(w, v).
Proof: If (X ,B) is a t-TS?, then we immediately have that (X ,B) is a t-TS.
Now we prove the converse.
If (X ,B) is not a t-TS?(w, v), then there exist s ≤ t blocks B1, . . . , Bs ∈ B, a
subset T ⊆ ⋃1≤i≤sBi with |T | ≥ w, and another block B′ ∈ B \ {B1, . . . , Bs} such
that
|T ∩B′| ≥ max
1≤i≤s
|T ∩Bi|. (4.1)
Now we take a w-subset T ′ ⊆ T such that (T ∩ B′) ⊆ T ′. This is doable since
|T ∩B′| ≤ |B′| = w. Hence
|T ′ ∩B′| = |T ∩B′|
≥ max
1≤i≤s
|T ∩Bi|
≥ max
1≤i≤s
|T ′ ∩Bi|,
where the first inequality follows from (4.1) and the second inequality follows from
T ′ ⊆ T . This implies that (X ,B) is not a t-TS, completing the proof. 
The above lemma illustrates that considering the condition T = w and T ≥ w is
basically the same. Here we also remark that in the definition of t-TS, considering
“for any s ≤ t blocks” is almost the same as that considering “for any t blocks”,
except for the trivial case that |B| ≤ t. Since for any set system (X ,B) such that
|B| > t, if there exist s < t blocks B1, . . . , Bs ∈ B and a w-subset T such that
{B′ ∈ B : |T ∩B′| = max
B∈B
|T ∩B|} * {B1, B2, . . . , Bs},
then we always can choose t− s blocks Bs+1, . . . , Bt ∈ B \ {B1, . . . , Bs} such that
{B′ ∈ B : |T ∩B′| = max
B∈B
|T ∩B|} * {Bs+1, . . . , Bt}.
This is doable since |B| ≥ t+1. Correspondingly, there also exist t blocks B1, . . . , Bt
contradicting the requirement of t-TS(w, v).
4.1.2 Known results
In [85], Stinson and Wei provided an upper bound for t-TS(w, v) as follows.
Theorem 4.1.4 ([85]) For any v ≥ w≥ 2, t ≥ 2, we have
Mt(w, v) ≤
(
v
dw/te
)
/
(
w − 1
dw/te − 1
)
.
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By investigating dw/t2e-own-subsets, Collins [29] improved the above upper
bound.
Theorem 4.1.5 ([29]) For any v ≥ w≥ 2, t ≥ 2, we have
Mt(w, v) ≤
(
v
dw/t2e
)
.
However, in the literature, no construction can produce t-TS(w, v) achieving the
above upper bound. As a matter of fact, this bound is still not tight. In the next
section, we show an interesting discovery of the relationship between TS and CFF.
Based on this important discovery, new upper bounds for t-TS(w, v) are derived,
which are great improvements on the previously known upper bounds. Moreover,
we describe several constructions in Section 4.3, which can produce infinite families
of t-TS(w, v) achieving our new upper bounds.
4.2 New upper bounds
To show our new upper bounds, we first state an interesting discovery on the re-
lationship between TS and CFF. As far as we know, this is the first relationship
between two kinds of anti-collusion schemes which strengthens the strength from t
to t2.
4.2.1 A new relationship between TS and CFF
Stinson and Wei [85] showed that a t-TS(w, v) is a t-CFF(w, v), as described in
Lemma 3.2.1. Here, we have a new relationship between TS and CFF as follows.
Lemma 4.2.1 A t-TS(w, v) is a t2-CFF(w, v).
Proof: Assume that (X ,B) is a t-TS(w, v). We would like to show that (X ,B) is
also a t2-CFF(w, v). Suppose, on the contrary, that (X ,B) is not a t2-CFF(w, v).
Then we try to prove (X ,B) is not a t-TS. That is, we would like to look for t distinct
blocks B1, . . . , Bt ∈ B and a descendant T generated by B1, . . . , Bt, such that there
exists another block in B\{B1, . . . , Bt} which has at least max{|T ∩Bi| : 1 ≤ i ≤ t}
points in common with T .
By the definition of t2-CFF, if it is not a t2-CFF, there exists B0 ∈ B which can
be covered by the union of some other t2 blocks from B \ {B0}. Denote B0 as the
collection of such t2 blocks.
By the pigeonhole principle, there exists at least one block B ∈ B0 such that
|B0 ∩B| ≥ dwt2 e. Denote
max{|B0 ∩B| : B ∈ B0} = dw
t2
e+ σ1,
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where 0 ≤ σ1 < w − dwt2 e. Assume that B1 ∈ B0 satisfies |B0 ∩B1| = dwt2 e+ σ1.
For 2 ≤ i ≤ t, choose Bi ∈ B0 \ {Bj : 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1} such that
|Bi ∩ (B0 \ ∪1≤j≤i−1Bj)| = σi > 0,
and
|(
⋃
2≤i≤t
Bi ∩B0) \B1| =
∑
2≤i≤t
σi ≥ 1
t+ 1
(w − dw
t2
e − σ1). (4.2)
The above t−1 blocks, satisfying σi > 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ t, are available, since if not,
then B0 would be covered by at most t distinct blocks, which contradicts Lemma
3.2.1. Inequality (4.2) can be realized by using the pigeonhole principle to t2 − 1
blocks in B0 \{B1}, that is, there exist t−1 blocks B2, . . . , Bt ∈ B0 \{B1} such that
|(
⋃
2≤i≤t
Bi ∩B0) \B1| ≥ t− 1
t2 − 1(|B0| − |B1 ∩B0|) =
1
t+ 1
(w − dw
t2
e − σ1).
By the assumption, for 2 ≤ i ≤ t, we have
σi ≤ |Bi ∩B0| ≤ |B1 ∩B0| = dw
t2
e+ σ1.
Now we are going to show that each block Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, has more than
∑
2≤i≤t σi
points which are not contained in any other Bj for 0 ≤ j ≤ t and j 6= i. To achieve
this goal, we want to show
0 ≤ |(
⋃
1≤i<j≤t
Bi ∩Bj) \B0| < w − (dw
t2
e+
∑
1≤i≤t
σi). (4.3)
Indeed, if
|(
⋃
1≤i<j≤t
Bi ∩Bj) \B0| ≥ w − (dw
t2
e+
∑
1≤i≤t
σi),
then any t of B0, B1, . . . , Bt can generate the same descendant, that is, a w-subset
of ⋃
0≤i<j≤t
(Bi ∩Bj),
where |⋃0≤i<j≤t(Bi ∩ Bj)| ≥ w, which contradicts Lemma 3.2.1. Thus inequality
(4.3) follows.
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Thus, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, we have
|Bi \
⋃
0≤j≤t,
j 6=i
Bj |= |Bi| − |Bi ∩ (
⋃
0≤j≤t,
j 6=i
Bj)|
= |Bi| − |Bi ∩B0| − |(Bi ∩ (
⋃
1≤j≤t,
j 6=i
Bj)) \B0|
=w − |Bi ∩B0| − |(
⋃
1≤j≤t,
j 6=i
Bi ∩Bj) \B0|
> w − (dw
t2
e+ σ1)− [w − (dw
t2
e+
∑
1≤i≤t
σi)]
=
∑
2≤i≤t
σi,
(4.4)
where the inequality follows from (4.3). That is, each block Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, has more
than
∑
2≤i≤t σi points which are not contained in any other Bj for 0 ≤ j ≤ t and
j 6= i.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ t, let Bˆi ⊆ Bi \
⋃
0≤j≤t,
j 6=i
Bj be a subset of Bi such that |Bˆi| =∑
2≤i≤t σi, which is available by (4.4). Clearly, Bˆi ∩ Bˆj = ∅ for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t.
To find a suitable descendant T of B1, . . . , Bt, we construct a set A ⊆
⋃
1≤i≤tBi
by including all points in B0 ∩Bi and Bˆi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. That is,
A =
⋃
1≤i≤t
((B0 ∩Bi) ∪ Bˆi).
Then the size of A is
|A| = |
⋃
1≤i≤t
(Bi ∩B0)|+ |
⋃
1≤i≤t
Bˆi|
= |B1 ∩B0|+ |(
⋃
2≤i≤t
Bi ∩B0) \B1|+
∑
1≤i≤t
|Bˆi|
= (dw
t2
e+ σ1) +
∑
2≤i≤t
σi + t
∑
2≤i≤t
σi
= dw
t2
e+ σ1 + (t+ 1)
∑
2≤i≤t
σi
≥ dw
t2
e+ σ1 + (t+ 1) 1
t+ 1
(w − dw
t2
e − σ1)
= w,
where the first equality follows from that Bˆi ∩ B0 = ∅ for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, the second
equality follows from that Bˆi ∩ Bˆj = ∅ for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t, and the inequality
follows from (4.2).
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Let T be a w-subset of A such that
⋃
1≤i≤t(Bi ∩ B0) ⊆ T . Such T exists since
T ⊆ A and |⋃1≤i≤t(Bi ∩B0)| ≤ |B0| = w. Furthermore, T ⊆ A ⊆ ⋃1≤i≤tBi. Thst
is, T is a descendant of B1, . . . , Bt. However,
|Bi ∩ T | ≤ |B0 ∩Bi|+
∑
2≤i≤t
σi ≤ dw
t2
e+
∑
1≤i≤t
σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ t,
and
|B0 ∩ T | = dw
t2
e+
∑
1≤i≤t
σi,
which contradicts the definition of t-TS(w, v).
Therefore, for any B ∈ B, it can not be covered by the union of any other t2
blocks from B \ {B}. The lemma follows. 
Here we remark that the converse of Lemma 4.2.1 is not correct. That is, a
t2-CFF(w, v) may not be a t-TS(w, v). We give evidence to this by virtue of the
following example.
Example 4.2.2 (A t2-CFF may not be a t-TS.)
Let X = {1, 2, . . . , 11} and B = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 5, 6}, {1, 2, 7, 8}, {1, 2, 9, 10},
{3, 5, 7, 11}}. Then (X ,B) is a 4-CFF(4, 11), but not a 2-TS(4, 11).
Indeed, each block has one private point which is not contained in any other
blocks. Thus each block can not be covered by the union of any other four blocks. It
is a 4-CFF(4, 11).
However, {1, 2, 3, 4} and {1, 2, 5, 6} can generate a new 4-subset {3, 4, 5, 6}, and
the fact
|{3, 4, 5, 6} ∩ {1, 2, 3, 4}| = |{3, 4}| = 2,
|{3, 4, 5, 6} ∩ {1, 2, 5, 6}| = |{5, 6}| = 2,
|{3, 4, 5, 6} ∩ {3, 5, 7, 11}| = |{3, 5}| = 2
implies that (X ,B) is not a 2-TS(4, 11).
With regards to Lemma 4.2.1, another natural question may be whether t2 is
the critical value for the relationship between TS and CFF. That is, is it possible
that a t-TS(w, v) is a t′-CFF(w, v), where t′ is an integer such that t′ > t2? We give
an example to show that a t-TS may not be a (t2 + 1)-CFF.
Example 4.2.3 (A t-TS may not be a (t2 + 1)-CFF.)
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Let X = {1, 2, . . . , 15} and
B = {B1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
B2 = {1, 6, 7, 8, 9},
B3 = {2, 6, 10, 11, 12},
B4 = {3, 7, 10, 13, 14},
B5 = {4, 8, 11, 13, 15},
B6 = {5, 9, 12, 14, 15}}.
It is obvious that for any two distinct blocks Bi and Bj, where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 6,
we have
|Bi ∩Bj | = 1.
By Definition 3.1.1 (1), it is easy to check that (X ,B) is a 2-TS(5, 15) with size 6.
In the meanwhile, (X ,B) is also a 4-CFF(5, 15) since no block can be covered by the
union of four others.
However, (X ,B) is not a 5-CFF(5, 15). In fact,
B1 ⊆ B2 ∪B3 ∪B4 ∪B5 ∪B6,
which implies that B1 can be covered by the union of five other blocks, contradicting
Definition 3.1.1 (4).
In conclusion, (X ,B) is a 2-TS(5, 15) and also a 4-CFF(5, 15), but not a 5-
CFF(5, 15).
Furthermore, the above example can be generalized to the following.
Example 4.2.4 (A t-TS may not be a (t2 + 1)-CFF.)
Let X = {1, 2, . . . , (t2+22 )} and
B = {B0 = {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , t2, t2 + 1},
B1 = {1, t2 + 2, t2 + 3, t2 + 4, . . . , 2t2, 2t2 + 1},
B2 = {2, t2 + 2, 2t2 + 2, 2t2 + 3, . . . , 3t2 − 1, 3t2},
B3 = {3, t2 + 3, 2t2 + 2, 3t2 + 1, . . . , 4t2 − 3, 4t2 − 2},
B4 = {4, t2 + 4, 2t2 + 3, 3t2 + 1, . . . , 5t2 − 6, 5t2 − 5},
. . .
Bt2 = {t2, 2t2, 3t2 − 1, 4t2 − 3, . . . ,
(
t2 + 2
2
)
− 2,
(
t2 + 2
2
)
},
Bt2+1 = {t2 + 1, 2t2 + 1, 3t2, 4t2 − 2, . . . ,
(
t2 + 2
2
)
− 1,
(
t2 + 2
2
)
}}.
Clearly, |Bi ∩Bj | = 1 for any 0 ≤ i < j ≤ t2 + 1.
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• (X ,B) is a t-TS(t2 + 1, (t2+22 )).
Indeed, for any B0 ⊆ B such that |B0| ≤ t and any (t2 + 1)-subset F ⊆⋃
B∈B0 B, we have
max
B∈B
|B ∩ F | ≥ max
B∈B0
|B ∩ F | ≥ t
2 + 1
|B0| ≥
t2 + 1
t
> t.
For any Bj ∈ B \ B0, we have
|Bj ∩ F | ≤ |Bj ∩ (
⋃
B∈B0
B)| = |B0| ≤ t < max
B∈B
|B ∩ F |,
as desired.
• (X ,B) is a t2-CFF(t2 + 1, (t2+22 )).
In fact, for any t2 + 1 distinct blocks Bi, Bj1 , . . . , Bjt2 ∈ B, we have
|Bi ∩ (
⋃
1≤k≤t2
Bjk)| = t2 < |Bi| = t2 + 1,
which implies that Bi cannot be covered by other t2 blocks.
• However, (X ,B) is not a (t2 + 1)-CFF(t2 + 1, (t2+22 )) since
B0 ⊆
⋃
1≤i≤t2+1
Bi.
4.2.2 A new upper bound for general t-TS
In [39], Erdős, Frankl and Füredi proved the following result.
Lemma 4.2.5 ([39]) Let (X ,B) be a t-CFF(w, v), and B ∈ B. The number of
dw/te-own-subsets in B is at least ( w−1dw/te−1).
Combining Lemma 4.2.1 and Lemma 4.2.5, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2.6 Let (X ,B) be a t-TS(w, v), and B ∈ B. The number of dw/t2e-own-
subsets in B is at least
(
w−1
dw/t2e−1
)
.
In the following, we prove a new upper bound for t-TS by means of the double-
counting technique. In combinatorics, double-counting, also called counting in two
ways, is a combinatorial argument technique of describing a finite set from two
perspectives, leading to two distinct expressions for the size of one set. In [66], van
Lint and Wilson also regard it as “one of the most important tools in combinatorics”.
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Theorem 4.2.7 For any v ≥ w≥ 2, t ≥ 2, we have
Mt(w, v) ≤
(
v
dw/t2e
)− ( w−1dw/t2e)(
w−1
dw/t2e−1
) .
Proof: Suppose (X ,B) is a t-TS(w,M, v). Denote ( Xdw/t2e) as the collection of all
dw/t2e-subsets of X . Clearly, |( Xdw/t2e)| = ( vdw/t2e). The following is to double count
the set {(T,B) : T ∈ ( Xdw/t2e), B ∈ B, T ⊆ B}. Denote
Σ := |{(T,B) : T ∈
( X
dw/t2e
)
, B ∈ B, T ⊆ B}|.
Then we have
Σ =
∑
T∈( Xdw/t2e)
∑
B∈B
s.t. T⊆B
1 =
∑
B∈B
∑
T∈( Xdw/t2e)
s.t. T⊆B
1.
(4.5)
On one hand, fixing B ∈ B, we have ∑
T∈( Xdw/t2e)
s.t. T⊆B
1 =
(
w
dw/t2e
)
. Then
Σ =
∑
B∈B
(
w
dw/t2e
)
= M
(
w
dw/t2e
)
. (4.6)
On the other hand, fixing T ∈ ( Xdw/t2e), there are the following two possible cases.
(a) If T is a dw/t2e-own-subset of some block B ∈ B, then we have ∑
B∈B
s.t. T⊆B
1 = 1.
(b) If T is not a dw/t2e-own-subset of any block B ∈ B, then we have ∑
B∈B
s.t. T⊆B
1 ≤
M .
For any B ∈ B, denote O(B) as the collection of all dw/t2e-own-subsets of the
block B. By Lemma 4.2.6, we have |O(B)| ≥ ( w−1dw/t2e−1). Without loss of generality,
we assume that
|
⋃
B∈B
O(B)| = M
(
w − 1
dw/t2e − 1
)
+ σ, σ ≥ 0.
Then the number of T ∈ ( Xdw/t2e), satisfying the condition of case (b), is at most(
v
dw/t2e
)
−M
(
w − 1
dw/t2e − 1
)
− σ.
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Thus by the first equality of (4.5),
Σ ≤ [M
(
w − 1
dw/t2e − 1
)
+ σ] +M [
(
v
dw/t2e
)
−M
(
w − 1
dw/t2e − 1
)
− σ]
= M [
(
v
dw/t2e
)
−M
(
w − 1
dw/t2e − 1
)
+
(
w − 1
dw/t2e − 1
)
]− (M − 1)σ
≤M [
(
v
dw/t2e
)
−M
(
w − 1
dw/t2e − 1
)
+
(
w − 1
dw/t2e − 1
)
].
(4.7)
From (4.6) and (4.7), we have
M
(
w
dw/t2e
)
≤M [
(
v
dw/t2e
)
−M
(
w − 1
dw/t2e − 1
)
+
(
w − 1
dw/t2e − 1
)
],
which implies
M ≤
(
v
dw/t2e
)− ( wdw/t2e)(
w−1
dw/t2e−1
) + 1 = ( vdw/t2e)− ( w−1dw/t2e)( w−1
dw/t2e−1
) ,
as desired. 
In the following, we use several examples to compare the new upper bound with
the previous results for t-TS.
Example 4.2.8 Let t = 2 and w = 5. The following Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2
show our improvements on the known upper bounds for 2-TS(5, v) and 4-TS(25, v),
respectively.
Figure 4.1: A comparison between known and new upper bounds for 2-TS(5, v)
Example 4.2.9 Let t = 2. We compare the known upper bound in Theorem 4.1.4
and our new upper bound in Theorem 4.2.7 for 2-TS(w, v), where 5 ≤ w ≤ 10,
2 ≤ v ≤ 80, in Figure 4.3. A comparison between Theorem 4.1.5 and Theorem 4.2.7
for 2-TS(w, v) is also shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.2: A comparison between known and new upper bounds for 4-TS(25, v)
Figure 4.3: A comparison between Theorem 4.1.4 and Theorem 4.2.7 for 2-TS(w, v)
Figure 4.4: A comparison between Theorem 4.1.5 and Theorem 4.2.7 for 2-TS(w, v)
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Example 4.2.10 Let t = 3. In Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, we compare the known
upper bounds in Theorem 4.1.4 and Theorem 4.1.5 with the new upper bound in
Theorem 4.2.7 for 3-TS(w, v), where 5 ≤ w ≤ 25, 20 ≤ v ≤ 80, respectively.
Figure 4.5: A comparison between Theorem 4.1.4 and Theorem 4.2.7 for 3-TS(w, v)
Figure 4.6: A comparison between Theorem 4.1.5 and Theorem 4.2.7 for 3-TS(w, v)
In the next section, we will give some constructions for t-TS which achieve the
new upper bound in Theorem 4.2.7.
By using the double-counting technique, we also can slightly improve one known
upper bound of t-CFF in [39]. Erdős, Frankl and Füredi [39] obtained the following
upper bound for t-CFF(w, v).
Theorem 4.2.11 ([39]) For any v ≥ w≥ 2, t ≥ 2, we have
ft(w, v) ≤
(
v
dw/te
)(
w−1
dw/te−1
) .
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Note that the double-counting technique used in the proof of Theorem 4.2.7 also
can be applied to derive an upper bound for t-CFF(w, v). More precisely, we have
the following upper bound for t-CFF(w, v), which is slightly better than that in
Theorem 4.2.11.
Theorem 4.2.12 For any v ≥ w≥ 2, t ≥ 2, we have
ft(w, v) ≤
(
v
dw/te
)− ( w−1dw/te)(
w−1
dw/te−1
) .
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.2.7 by using Lemma 4.2.5, and
we omit it here. 
4.2.3 A better upper bound for t-TS in some special cases
Besides the upper bound for general t-TS(w, v) that we proved in the preceding
subsection, a better upper bound for several special cases can be obtained. Erdős,
Frankl and Füredi [39] provided the following bound for fr(w, v).
Theorem 4.2.13 ([39]) Let w = r(dwr e − 1) + 1 + d where 0 ≤ d ≤ r − 1. Then
for v > 2ddwr e
(
w
dw/re
)
,
fr(w, v) ≤
(
v−d
dw/re
)(
w−d
dw/re
)
holds in the following cases:
(a) d = 0, 1, (b) d < r/(2dw
r
e2), (c) dw
r
e = 2 and d < d2r/3e.
By using the relationship in Lemma 4.2.1, we have the following bound for t-TS.
Theorem 4.2.14 Let w = t2(dw
t2
e − 1) + 1 + d where 0 ≤ d ≤ t2 − 1. Then for
v > 2ddw
t2
e( wdw/t2e),
Mt(w, v) ≤
(
v−d
dw/t2e
)(
w−d
dw/t2e
)
holds in the following cases:
(a) d = 0, 1, (b) d < t2/(2dw
t2
e2), (c) dw
t2
e = 2 and d < d2t2/3e.
Proof: This theorem follows from Lemma 4.2.1 and Theorem 4.2.13. 
Recalling the corresponding application in broadcast encryption, our new upper
bound in Theorem 4.2.7 means that the traitor tracing scheme based on a t-TS(w, v)
can accommodate at most (
(
v
dw/t2e
)− ( w−1dw/t2e))/( w−1dw/t2e−1) users, and futhermore, in
several cases as described in Theorem 4.2.14, it can only accommodate at most(
v−d
dw/t2e
)
/
(
w−d
dw/t2e
)
users. In the next section, we will provide several constructions for
t-TS, most of which are optimal, that is, the traitor tracing schemes based on such
t-TS can accommodate the largest possible number of users.
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4.3 New lower bounds
In this section, we give several constructions for t-TS(w, v). When w ≤ t2, in Section
4.3.1, we show optimal t-TS(w, v) from sunflowers based on the new upper bounds in
the preceding section. When w > t2, in Section 4.3.2, constructions of TS by means
of combinatorial designs are provided, which can produce many infinite families of
optimal TS achieving our new upper bounds. For the general TS, in Section 4.3.3,
a constructive lower bound for general TS is given, which has the same order of
magnitude with the new upper bounds.
4.3.1 When w ≤ t2: Constructions from sunflowers
Theorem 4.3.1 For any v ≥ w≥ 2, t ≥ 2, we have
Mt(w, v) ≥ v − w + 1.
Proof: We prove this theorem by providing a construction by means of sunflowers.
Suppose X is a v-set of points. Arbitrarily choose a (w − 1)-subset ∆ ⊆ X . Define
Bj := ({j} ∪∆) ⊆ X , for ∀j ∈ X \∆,
and denote B := {Bj : j ∈ X \ ∆}. Clearly, (X ,B) is a sunflower according to
Definition 2.1.4. (The case ∆ = {v − w + 2, . . . , v} is depicted in Figure 4.7.)
Figure 4.7: A construction of t-TS(w, v)
Then (X ,B) is a t-TS(w, v) for any t ≥ 2, since besides the common subset ∆,
each block possesses a unique point. So
Mt(w, v) ≥ |B| = v − (w − 1) = v − w + 1,
as desired. 
We have the following result for the case w ≤ t2.
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Corollary 4.3.2 For any v ≥ w≥ 2, t ≥ 2 with w ≤ t2, we have
Mt(w, v) = v − w + 1.
Proof: From Theorem 4.2.7, we have Mt(w, v) ≤ v − w + 1 for w ≤ t2. Then the
corollary follows from Theorem 4.3.1. 
Note that the size of t-TS(w, v) we obtained in Theorem 4.3.1 is far from the
upper bound in Theorem 4.2.7 for w > t2. So we explore other constructions in the
next subsection.
4.3.2 When w > t2: Constructions from combinatorial designs
Combinatorial structures are often used to construct various configurations in coding
theory. In this subsection, we use combinatorial designs to construct t-TS(w, v).
In [85], Stinson and Wei used τ -(v, w, 1) design to construct t-TS(w, v) as follows.
Theorem 4.3.3 ([85]) If there exists a τ -(v, w, 1) design, then there exists a t-
TS(w, v) with cardinality
(
v
τ
)
/
(
w
τ
)
, where t = b√(w − 1)/(τ − 1)c.
We provide a generalized construction as follows.
Theorem 4.3.4 Let w ≡ d+1 (mod t2) where 0 ≤ d ≤ t2−1 and let τ = dw/t2e. If
there exists a τ -(v−d,w−d, 1) design, then there exists a t-TS(w, v) with cardinality(
v−d
τ
)
/
(
w−d
τ
)
.
Proof: Let X be a v-set of points. Suppose there exists a τ -(v− d,w− d, 1) design
(X0,B0), where X0 ⊆ X , |X \X0| = d. Extending each block B0 ∈ B0 to the d points
of X \ X0 to obtain
B = {B0 ∪ (X \ X0) : B0 ∈ B0}.
Clearly, |B| = |B0| =
(
v−d
τ
)
/
(
w−d
τ
)
, and |B| = w for any B ∈ B. We prove that
(X ,B) is a t-TS(w, v).
Suppose B1, . . . , Bs ∈ B, 2 ≤ s ≤ t, are s distinct blocks and Bs+1 ∈ B \ {Bi :
1 ≤ i ≤ s} is any other block. For any B ⊆ ∪1≤i≤sBi such that |B| = w, we want
to show that
|B ∩Bs+1| < max{|B ∩Bi| : 1 ≤ i ≤ s}. (4.8)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ s+ 1, denote
B′i = Bi ∩ X0 ∈ B0.
Equivalently, B′i is the corresponding original block in B0 which is extended to Bi.
Denote B′ = B ∩ X0. Clearly,
B′ ⊆
⋃
1≤i≤s
B′i. (4.9)
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Note that |B′| ≥ w − d rather than |B′| = w − d, so more detailed analyses are
required. Assume that
|B \B′| = |B ∩ (X \ X0)| = δ, 0 ≤ δ ≤ d.
Then |B′| = w− δ. On the one hand, applying the pigeonhole principle to (4.9), we
have
max{|B′ ∩B′i| : 1 ≤ i ≤ s} ≥ d
w − δ
s
e ≥ dw − d
t
e = t(dw
t2
e − 1) + 1.
Since X \ X0 is contained in each block B ∈ B, we have |B ∩ Bi| = |B′ ∩ B′i| + δ.
Moreover,
max{|B ∩Bi| : 1 ≤ i ≤ s} ≥ t(dw
t2
e − 1) + δ + 1. (4.10)
On the other hand, since (X0,B0) is a τ -(v − d,w − d, 1) design, we have
|B′ ∩B′s+1| ≤ |(
⋃
1≤i≤s
B′i) ∩B′s+1|
= |
⋃
1≤i≤s
(B′i ∩B′s+1)|
≤
∑
1≤i≤s
|B′i ∩B′s+1|
≤ s(τ − 1)
≤ t(dw
t2
e − 1).
Thus
|B ∩Bs+1| = |B′ ∩B′s+1|+ δ ≤ t(d
w
t2
e − 1) + δ. (4.11)
Hence, (4.8) can be obtained from (4.10) and (4.11). With the definition, (X ,B) is
a t-TS(w, v) and the theorem follows. 
As can be seen from Theorem 4.2.14 and Theorem 4.3.4, when all the parameters
v, w, t, d, τ satisfy the conditions therein, the t-TS(w, v) constructed from τ -(v −
d,w − d, 1) design is optimal. From this point of view, the existence of τ -(v, w, 1)
design is crucial to the existence of optimal t-TS. We list several infinite families of
optimal t-TS(w, v) as follows.
Theorem 4.3.5 Let t be a prime power and d be an integer such that 0 ≤ d <
d2t2/3e. There exists an optimal t-TS(t2 + d + 1, t2n + t2(n−1) + · · · + t2 + d + 1)
provided n ≥ 2 + min{2, d}.
Proof: A 2-(qn + · · · + q + 1, q + 1, 1) design exists whenever q is a prime power
and n ≥ 2 [28]. From Theorem 4.3.4, assuming q = t2, for 0 ≤ d ≤ t2 − 1, there
exists a t-TS(t2 + d+ 1, t2n + t2(n−1) + · · ·+ t2 + d+ 1). Noting that d t2+d+1
t2
e = 2,
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if 0 ≤ d < d2t2/3e, then this satisfies the condition of case (c) in Theorem 4.2.14.
It follows that the above t-TS(t2 + d+ 1, t2n + t2(n−1) + · · ·+ t2 + d+ 1) is optimal
when
t2n + t2(n−1) + · · ·+ t2 + d+ 1 > 2d(t2 + d)(t2 + d+ 1),
which holds when n ≥ 2 + min{2, d}. 
Theorem 4.3.6 Let t ≥ 2 be an integer such that t2 + 1 is a prime power. Let d be
an integer such that 0 ≤ d < d2t2/3e. There exists an optimal t-TS(t2 + d+ 1, (t2 +
1)n + d) provided n ≥ 2 + min{2, d}.
Proof: A 2-(qn, q, 1) design exists whenever q is a prime power and n ≥ 2 [28]. From
Theorem 4.3.4, assuming that q = t2 + 1 is a prime power, for 0 ≤ d ≤ t2 − 1, there
exists a t-TS(t2+d+1, (t2+1)n+d). Noting that d t2+d+1
t2
e = 2, if 0 ≤ d < d2t2/3e,
then this satisfies the condition of case (c) in Theorem 4.2.14. It follows that the
above t-TS(t2 + d+ 1, (t2 + 1)n + d) is optimal when
(t2 + 1)n + d > 2d(t2 + d)(t2 + d+ 1),
which holds when n ≥ 2 + min{2, d}. 
Theorem 4.3.7 Let t be a positive integer power of 2, and d be an integer such that
d ∈ {0, 1} or 0 ≤ d < t2/18. There exists an optimal t-TS(2t2 +d+1, 2nt2n+d+1)
provided n ≥ 2 + 2 min{1, d}.
Proof: A 3-(qn + 1, q + 1, 1) design exists whenever q is a prime power and n ≥ 2
[28]. From Theorem 4.3.4, assuming q = 2t2 (a power of 2), for 0 ≤ d ≤ t2−1, there
exists a t-TS(2t2 + d + 1, 2nt2n + d + 1). Note that if d ∈ {0, 1} or 0 ≤ d < t2/18,
then this satisfies the condition of case (a) or (b) in Theorem 4.2.14. It follows that
the above t-TS(2t2 + d+ 1, 2nt2n + d+ 1) is optimal when
2nt2n + d+ 1 > d(2t2 + d+ 1)(2t2 + d)(2t2 + d− 1),
which holds when n ≥ 2 + 2 min{1, d}. 
Theorem 4.3.8 Let t be a prime power and d be an integer such that 0 ≤ d ≤ t2/4.
There exists an optimal t-TS(t2 + d+ 1, t6 + d+ 1).
Proof: A 2-(q3 + 1, q + 1, 1) design exists whenever q is a prime power [28]. From
Theorem 4.3.4, assuming q = t2, for 0 ≤ d ≤ t2−1, there exists a t-TS(t2+d+1, t6+
d+1). Noting that d t2+d+1
t2
e = 2, if 0 ≤ d < d2t2/3e, then this satisfies the condition
of case (c) in Theorem 4.2.14. It follows that the above t-TS(t2 + d+ 1, t6 + d+ 1)
is optimal when
t6 + d+ 1 > 2d(t2 + d)(t2 + d+ 1),
which holds when 0 ≤ d ≤ t2/4. 
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Theorem 4.3.9 Let v be an integer such that v ≡ 1, 5 (mod 20), and d ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
There exists an optimal 2-TS(5 + d, v + d) with size v(v − 1)/20, provided v >
2d3 + 18d2 + 39d.
Proof: A 2-(v, 5, 1) design exists whenever v ≡ 1, 5 (mod 20) [28]. By Theorem
4.3.4, for 0 ≤ d ≤ 3, there exists a 2-TS(5 + d, v + d) with size v(v − 1)/20. Noting
that d5+d
22
e = 2, if 0 ≤ d < d2t2/3e = 3, then this satisfies the condition of case
(c) in Theorem 4.2.14. It follows that the above 2-TS(5 + d, v + d) is optimal when
v > 2d3 + 18d2 + 39d. 
In [85], Stinson and Wei gave constructions for t-TS via 2-(q2 + q + 1, q + 1, 1)
design and 3-(q2 + 1, q + 1, 1) design, which are special cases of Theorem 4.3.5 and
Theorem 4.3.7. Particularly, in the above theorems, we show that their constructions
and our generalized constructions can produce infinite families of optimal t-TS.
By Theorem 2.3.6, we also have
Theorem 4.3.10 Let w ≡ d+ 1 (mod t2) where 0 ≤ d ≤ t2 − 1 and let τ = dw/t2e.
Then for any sufficiently large v such that(
v − d− i
τ − i
)
≡ 0 (mod
(
w − d− i
τ − i
)
), ∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ τ − 1, (4.12)
there exists an optimal t-TS(w, v) in the following cases:
(a) d = 0, 1, (b) d < t2/(2τ2), (c) τ = 2 and d < d2t2/3e.
Proof: From Theorem 2.3.6, for sufficiently large v, there exists a τ -(v−d,w−d, 1)
design if the condition (4.12) holds. Then there exists a t-TS(w, v) with cardinal-
ity
(
v−d
τ
)
/
(
w−d
τ
)
, which follows from Theorem 4.3.4. It is optimal for the cases in
Theorem 4.2.14. 
In the next subsection, we provide a constructive lower bound for general t-
TS(w, v).
4.3.3 A general constructive lower bound
In [85], Stinson and Wei proposed to use another type of combinatorial designs,
packings, to construct TS.
Lemma 4.3.11 ([85]) If there exists a dw/t2e-(v, w, 1) packing, then there exists a
t-TS(w, v).
A similar generalization with Theorem 4.3.4 is the following.
Theorem 4.3.12 Let w ≡ d + 1 (mod t2) where 0 ≤ d ≤ t2 − 1. If there exists a
dw/t2e-(v − d,w − d, 1) packing, then there exists a t-TS(w, v).
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Considering the substance in the above theorem, we have the following construc-
tive lower bound for general t-TS.
Theorem 4.3.13 Let w ≡ d+ 1 (mod t2) where 0 ≤ d ≤ t2− 1. For any v ≥ w, we
have
Mt(w, v) ≥
(
v − d
dw/t2e
)
/
(
w − d
dw/t2e
)2
.
Proof: First, let v′ = v − d, w′ = w − d. Suppose X is a finite set of v points, and
X0 is a d-subset of X . Denote X ′ = X \ X0. We use the following Algorithm 1.
Clearly, for each i, we have
|Di \ Di−1| ≤
(
w′
dw/t2e
)(
v′ − dw/t2e
w′ − dw/t2e
)
.
Hence
|B| ≥
(
v′
w′
)(
w′
dw/t2e
)(v′−dw/t2e
w′−dw/t2e
) = ( v′dw/t2e
)
/
(
w′
dw/t2e
)2
.
Now, it is sufficient to prove that the collection of blocks B generated by Algorithm
1 is a t-TS(w, v). This follows from Theorem 4.3.12, since for the output B of
Algorithm 1, the set system (X ′,B′), where B′ = {B \ X0 : B ∈ B}, is a dw/t2e-
(v − d,w − d, 1) packing.
Consequently, we have
Mt(w, v) ≥
(
v − d
dw/t2e
)
/
(
w − d
dw/t2e
)2
,
as desired. 
Moreover, we have
Theorem 4.3.14 Let w ≡ d+1 (mod t2) where 0 ≤ d ≤ t2−1. For any sufficiently
large v, we have
Mt(w, v) ≥ (1− o(1))
(
v − d
dw/t2e
)
/
(
w − d
dw/t2e
)
.
Proof: This theorem follows from Theorem 4.3.12 and Theorem 2.3.7. 
We make remarks here that the constructive lower bound in Theorem 4.3.13 has
the same order of magnitude as our general upper bound in Theorem 4.2.7, and the
lower bound in Theorem 4.3.14 is very close to our upper bound in Theorem 4.2.14.
Our constructions of t-TS provide the way of distributing base keys for the data
supplier to resist collusion attacks from traitors. The infinite families of optimal t-
TS show that there exist TS-based traitor tracing schemes which can accommodate
the largest possible number of users.
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4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated the traceability schemes (TS). We found a very
interesting relationship between TS and CFF in Section 4.2.1, that is, a t-TS is a
t2-CFF. This relationship has a significant meaning for TS in both the combinatorial
viewpoint and its applications in broadcast encryption. Based on this new relation-
ship, we derived new upper bounds on the size of TS for general cases in Section
4.2.2 and for several special cases in Section 4.2.2, respectively. Our new bounds
greatly improve the previously known upper bounds in [85] and [29]. By means of
sunflowers, we constructed optimal t-TS(w, v) for the case w ≤ t2 in Section 4.3.1.
By means of combinatorial designs, we constructed several infinite families of opti-
mal t-TS(w, v) for the case w > t2 in Section 4.3.2, A constructive lower bound for
general TS, based on combinatorial packings, was given in Section 4.3.3, which has
the same order of magnitude with the new upper bounds.
In Section 4.3, we have already shown that our new upper bounds in Theorem
4.2.7 and Theorem 4.2.14 can be achieved in many cases. It would be of interest
to determine whether the new upper bounds are tight or not for other parameters.
If they are tight, then constructions for t-TS achieving the upper bounds are also
expected.
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Chapter 5
Parent-Identifying Set Systems
In this chapter, we concentrate on the parent-identifying set systems (IPPSs). First,
in Section 5.1, we propose a unified concept of parent-identifying schemes for many
combinatorial structures with the parent-identifying property, such as parent-identifying
codes for digital fingerprinting and single-user tracing superimposed families for
group testing. An equivalent relationship between parent-identifying schemes and
forbidden configurations is established, which is extremely useful to analyze and
derive bounds for various parent-identifying schemes. Moreover, we correspond the
research problems of parent-identifying schemes to a kind of Turán-type problems.
In Section 5.2, some remarks on the definition of IPPS and the related known results
of IPPS are stated. In Section 5.3, we prove a new upper bound for t-IPPS by virtue
of techniques in extremal set theory, which greatly improve the previously known
bound. In Section 5.4, we derive a lower bound for t-IPPS with the probabilistic
methods, which has the same order of magnitude with the new upper bound in
Section 5.3. In Section 5.5, we analyze the structure of 2-IPPS, and an equivalent
combinatorial description of 2-IPPS is provided. We also derive better upper bounds
for 2-IPPS(4, v) and 3-IPPS(6, v), respectively, by means of the well-known graph
removal lemma in extremal graph theory. Finally, we summarize this chapter in
Section 5.6. This chapter is based on results in [50, 51].
5.1 Forbidden configurations
In this section, we unify the combinatorial structures with the parent-identifying
property by a concept of parent-identifying schemes (Definition 5.1.1). An equiva-
lent relationship between parent-identifying schemes and forbidden configurations is
established (Theorem 5.1.5), which is extremely useful to analyze and derive bounds
for various parent-identifying schemes.
5.1.1 A unified concept of parent-identifying schemes
As Pearl wrote in the preface of his book [69], the central aim of many studies in
the physical, behavioral, social, and biological sciences is the elucidation of cause-
effect relationships among variables or events. Parent-identifying scheme provides a
way to identify causes from an effect for some information systems such as digital
fingerprinting and group testing. We use the “f -channel” to unify different functional
mappings from causes to effects, see Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: f -channel
Definition 5.1.1 Let Q be a finite set of possible causes. A subset C of Qn or 2Q
is a t-parent-identifying scheme under f -channel if for any C′ ⊆ C with |C′| ≤ t and
any d ∈ f(C′), we have ⋂
P∈Pt(d)
P 6= ∅,
where
Pt(d) = {P ⊆ C : |P| ≤ t, d ∈ f(P)}.
The above definition exhibits the essential idea of cause clarification algorithms
in parent-identifying schemes, that is, once an effect d is observed, one needs to
check each subset P ⊆ C with size at most t to see if d can be generated by P. If
d can be generated by P, then we call d a descendant of P and call P a possible
parent set of d. The intersection of all possible parent sets has to be a subset of true
causes for d.
We remark that Anthapadmanabhan, Barg and Dumer [7] also investigated a
t-input-single-output channel, which is similar to the above f -channel, under the
marking assumption for digital fingerprinting from an information-theoretic view-
point. The interested reader is referred to [7]. In this thesis, we are primarily
concerned with the combinatorial properties of the f -channel in Definition 5.1.1.
In Definition 5.1.1, if C ⊂ Qn, then it can be regarded as a class of fingerprinting
codes. Well-known examples include codes with the t-identifiable parent property
(t-IPP codes) [4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 53, 82, 90], where
f(P) = P(1)× P(2)× · · · × P(n),
and P(i) = {c(i) ∈ Q : c = (c(1), . . . , c(n)) ∈ P}.
However, it is not necessarily always the case. In some scenario, C may be
a collection of subsets of Q, that is, C ⊆ 2Q, which forms a set system. A typical
example is the t-single-user tracing superimposed family, introduced for applications
in molecular biology [31, 1], where
f(P) = {
⋃
A∈P
A}.
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In this dissertation, we investigate two parent-identifying schemes, according to
their f -channels, in different applications, namely, IPPS for broadcast encryption
(this chapter) and multimedia parent-identifying codes (MIPPC) for multimedia
fingerprinting (Chapter 7). We focus on the size (or in other words, code rate), one
of the most important parameters, of such parent-identifying schemes.
In the literature, Alon et al. [6] proved that the asymptotically optimal code rate
of t-IPP code is 1bt2/4c+t . Csúrös et al. [31] and Alon et al. [1] showed that the code
rate of a t-single-user tracing superimposed family is Θ(1t ). However, there are no
general lower bounds for t-IPPS and t-MIPPC in the literature. In this dissertation,
we will use the probabilistic expurgation method to derive lower bounds for t-IPPS
(Section 5.4) and t-MIPPC (Section 7.2), and compare them with the best known
upper bounds.
To this end, in Section 5.1.2, we first establish an equivalent relationship between
parent-identifying schemes and forbidden configurations.
5.1.2 A kind of Turán-type problems
As wrote by Füredi in [44], one of the most important problems in every branch
of mathematics is the description of structure of its objects. In this subsection,
we provide an equivalent description of parent-identifying schemes by using their
forbidden configurations.
In extremal combinatorics, a class of extremal problems known as Turán-type
problems, named for Pál Turán [92], consists of problems that aim to maximize the
size of a certain object while avoiding a series of forbidden substructures. Turán-
type problems are often very difficult and very little is known even about some
simple cases. Recent surveys on Turán-type problems are referred to [44] and [61].
In the following, we correspond the research problems of parent-identifying schemes
to a kind of Turán-type problems.
In [9], Barg et al. exploited the notion of minimal forbidden configuration to
study IPP codes. We recap the related notations here.
Definition 5.1.2 In a set C, let F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} be a collection of subsets of C
with Fi ⊆ C, |Fi| ≤ t, i = 1, . . . ,m. Then F is called a configuration if it has an
empty intersection, ∩1≤i≤mFi = ∅. Moreover, F is called a minimal configuration
if it is minimal under inclusion, that is,⋂
1≤j≤m,
j 6=i
Fj 6= ∅, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Denote U(F) = ∪1≤i≤mFi. The cardinality of U(F) is called the size of the config-
uration F . In [9], Barg et al. proved the following lemma for the size of a minimal
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configuration, which was also shown by Staddon et al. in [82] and Alon et al. in [6].
Denote u := b( t2 + 1)2c. To be self-contained, we expose the proof in the following.
Lemma 5.1.3 ([6], [9], [82]) Let F be a minimal configuration. Then |U(F)| ≤ u.
Proof: Suppose F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} be a minimal configuration. Then for each
1 ≤ i ≤ m, there exists a codeword xi such that
xi /∈ Fi and xi ∈
⋂
1≤j≤m,
j 6=i
Fj .
Clearly, xi 6= xj for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m. Therefore
|U(F)| = |{x1,x2, . . . ,xm}|+ |
⋃
1≤i≤m
Fi \ {x1, . . . ,xm}|
≤ m+
∑
1≤i≤m
(|Fi| − (m− 1))
≤ m+m(t−m+ 1)
= −m2 + (t+ 2)m
≤ ( t
2
+ 1)2.
where the last inequality holds by taking m = t2 + 1. The lemma follows. 
Now we define the forbidden configuration.
Definition 5.1.4 Let C be a t-parent-identifying scheme under f -channel. A (min-
imal) forbidden configuration in C is a (minimal) configuration F = {F1, . . . ,Fm}
in C such that
f(F1) ∩ f(F2) ∩ · · · ∩ f(Fm) 6= ∅.
Then we have the following relationship.
Theorem 5.1.5 A set C is not a t-parent-identifying scheme under f -channel if
and only if there exists a minimal forbidden configuration in C with size at most u.
Proof: The sufficiency follows from Definition 5.1.1 and Definition 5.1.4 directly.
We focus on the necessity. If C is not a t-parent-identifying scheme under f -channel,
then there exists a subset C′ ⊆ C and a descendant d ∈ f(C′) such that⋂
P∈Pt(d)
P = ∅.
Then we can find a minimal forbidden configuration in
Pt(d) = {P ⊆ C : |P| ≤ t, d ∈ f(P)}.
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This is doable since we can consecutively remove some P from Pt(d), if the intersec-
tion of remaining subsets is still empty, until it forms a minimal configuration. The
size of the minimal configuration, which is at most u, follows from Lemma 5.1.3.
The proof is completed. 
By Theorem 5.1.5, we have the following Turán-type problems.
Fact 5.1.6 The research problem for parent-identifying schemes is to maximize the
size |C| while avoiding any C0 ⊆ C such that |C0| ≤ u and C0 forms a minimal
forbidden configuration as in Definition 5.1.2.
Different f -channels lead to different parent-identifying schemes. By Theorem
5.1.5, different parent-identifying schemes correspond to different minimal forbidden
configurations. To derive a lower bound for the size of a parent-identifying scheme,
we can use the probabilistic expurgation method, that is, to estimate the expectation
number of its corresponding minimal forbidden configurations, and then delete one
element from each of them. We will derive probabilistic existence lower bounds for
IPPS (Section 5.4) and MIPPC (Section 7.2) in this way.
5.2 Definition and known results
5.2.1 Definition
The definition of IPPS was provided in Definition 3.1.1 (2). Here we give some
remarks for that definition. First, we note that the IPPS defined in Definition
3.1.1(2) requires that condition |T | = w. Modifying it to all the case |T | ≥ w, we
have the following definition of t-IPPS?.
Definition 5.2.1 A t-parent-identifying? set system, denoted t-IPPS?(w, v), is a
set system (X ,B) such that B ⊆ (Xw) and |X | = v, with the property that for any
T ⊆ X such that |T | ≥ w, either Pt(T ) is empty, or⋂
P∈Pt(T )
P 6= ∅,
where
Pt(T ) := {P ⊆ B : |P| ≤ t, T ⊆
⋃
B∈P
B}.
Considering the relationship between IPPS and IPPS?, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.2.2 A set system (X ,B) is a t-IPPS(w, v) if and only if it is a t-IPPS?(w, v).
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Proof: The sufficiency directly follows from their definitions. We focus on the
necessity. Suppose (X ,B) is a t-IPPS(w, v), we would like to show that it is also
a t-IPPS?(w, v). Consider any T ⊆ X with |T | ≥ w and Pt(T ) 6= ∅. Choosing a
w-subset T0 ⊆ T , we have
Pt(T ) ⊆ Pt(T0),
since for any P ∈ Pt(T ), we have T ⊆
⋃
B∈P B and then T0 ⊆ T ⊆
⋃
B∈P B, which
implies that P ∈ Pt(T0). By the definition of t-IPPS(w, v), we have⋂
P∈Pt(T0)
P 6= ∅.
Hence we have
∅ 6=
⋂
P∈Pt(T0)
P ⊆
⋂
P∈Pt(T )
P.
Thus (X ,B) is a t-IPPS?(w, v) by Definition 5.2.1, and the necessity follows. 
5.2.2 Known results
By investigating d wbt2/4c+dt/2ee-own-subsets, Collins gave an upper bound for t-
IPPS(w, v) as follows.
Theorem 5.2.3 ([29]) Let v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ 2 be integers. Then
It(w, v) ≤
(
v
d wbt2/4c+dt/2e e
)
( d wbt/2c+1 e−1
d wbt2/4c+dt/2e e−1
) = O(vd wbt2/4c+dt/2e e).
In Chapter 4, to improve the known upper bounds for t-TS, we first proved that
a t-TS is a t2-CFF in Section 4.2 and then derived new upper bounds based on this
new relationship. For t-IPPS, it was shown a t-IPPS is a t-CFF in Lemma 3.2.1. A
natural question is that: is it possible that a t-IPPS is a t′-CFF, where t′ > t? In
the following, we give a negative answer by Example 5.2.4.
Example 5.2.4 Let v > w > t > 1 be positive integers such that v = w(t+1), w =
r(t + 1). Let X be a finite set of v points. Considering a family of w-subsets
F = {F0, F1, . . . , Ft+1} ⊆
(X
w
)
such that
(c1) Fi ∩ Fj = ∅, ∀ i 6= j ∈ {1, . . . , t+ 1},
(c2) |Fi ∩ F0| = r, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , t+ 1}.
Now we claim that F is a t-IPPS but not a (t+ 1)-CFF.
On the one hand, F is a t-IPPS. That is, for any w-subset of X which belongs to
the union of some t blocks in F , at least one of these sets can be uniquely determined.
Indeed, let T be a w-subset of X generated by some coalition U ⊆ F .
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• If there exists an element x0 ∈ T such that x0 /∈ F0, then by property (c1), this
x0 belongs to the unique defined set Fj, 1 ≤ j ≤ t + 1. This Fj must appear
in each parent set of T .
• Otherwise, if there is no such x0 ∈ T , then T = F0. Therefore any coalition
which can generate T has to contain F0 since the union of any t blocks of
{F1, . . . , Ft+1} can not cover F0 by the lack of cardinality, see property (c2).
On the other hand, F is not a (t+1)-CFF, since F0 can be covered by F1, . . . , Ft+1.
From the above example, we cannot improve the known upper bound for t-
IPPS as that for t-TS, that is, by virtue of its relationship with t-CFF. In Section
5.3, we show our improvement on the upper bound for t-IPPS by investigating the
own-subsets.
5.3 A new upper bound for t-IPPS
In this section, we prove a new upper bound for t-IPPS and compare it with the
known results. We also analyze our new upper bound by virtue of Theorem 5.1.5.
Noting that the exponent of v in the upper bound of Nt(w, v) in Theorem 5.2.3,
that is d wbt2/4c+dt/2ee, is exactly the size of the own-subset investigated by Collins [29].
To improve the upper bound in Theorem 5.2.3, we should try to find an own-subset
with smaller size possessed by some block.
In the following Theorem 5.3.1, we provide a better upper bound than Theorem
5.2.3, by showing that some block of a t-IPPS must contain at least one d wbt2/4c+te-
own-subsets.
Theorem 5.3.1 Let v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ 2 be integers. Then
It(w, v) ≤
(
v
d wbt2/4c+te
)
= O(v
d wbt2/4c+t e).
Before proving this theorem, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3.2 Let (X ,B) be a t-IPPS(w, v). There exists one block B ∈ B contain-
ing at least one d wbt2/4c+te-own-subset.
Proof: Suppose on the contrary that each block B ∈ B does not contain any
d wbt2/4c+te-own-subset. That is, for each block B ∈ B and each d wbt2/4c+te-subset
B0 ⊆ B, there exists another block B′ ∈ B\{B} such that B0 ⊆ B′. Then we would
like to derive a contradiction with the assumption that (X ,B) is a t-IPPS(w, v). In
other words, we try to find a collection of subsets P0,P1, . . . ,Pm of B, each of which
has size at most t, such that all Pi can generate the same descendant T , but their
intersection is empty. To this end, we
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• pick m ≤ b t2c + 1 blocks B1, . . . , Bm from B to form P0, and construct a
descendant T of P0;
• for each Bi, look for a subset C(i) ⊆ B \ {Bi} of at most t −m + 1 blocks to
substitute it, forming Pi which has size at most t and is also a parent set of
T .
In the following, we show the explicit process to realize this.
First, arbitrarily choose a block B1 ∈ B. Let i = 1 and A0 = B0 = D0 = ∅.
Next turn to execute a while loop.
While 1 ≤ i ≤ b t2c and
|Bi \ (∪0≤j≤i−1(Aj ∪Dj))| ≥ d wbt2/4c+ te(d
t
2
e+ 1),
take a subset Ai ⊆ Bi \ (∪0≤j≤i−1(Aj ∪Dj)) such that |Ai| = d wbt2/4c+ted t2e. With
the assumption, Ai can be covered by at most d t2e distinct blocks in B other than
Bi. Denote C(i) ⊆ B \ {Bi} such that |C(i)| ≤ d t2e and Ai ⊆
⋃
B∈C(i) B. Note that
some Bj , j 6= i, may appear in C(i). This is allowed since it does not increase the
number of blocks that we are looking for to keep the size of Pi at most t. We have
Bi \ (
⋃
0≤j≤i−1
(Aj ∪Dj) ∪Ai) *
⋃
0≤j≤i−1
Bj ,
since if not, Bi would be covered by at most t other blocks {Bj : 0 ≤ j ≤ i−1}∪C(i),
which contradicts Lemma 3.2.1. This allows us to take another subset Di ⊆ Bi \
(
⋃
0≤j≤i−1(Aj ∪Dj) ∪Ai) such that |Di| = d wbt2/4c+te and
Di *
⋃
0≤j≤i−1
Bj .
With the assumption, there exists another block Bi+1 ∈ B \ {Bj : 1 ≤ j ≤ i}
such that Di ⊆ Bi+1. Let i = i + 1 and continually execute the while loop of this
paragraph.
The above while loop stops when one of the following two cases holds:
(a) i = b t2c+ 1;
(b) i ≤ b t2c and 0 ≤ |Bi \ (∪0≤j≤i−1(Aj ∪Dj))| < d wbt2/4c+te(d t2e+ 1).
Let m = i. Take Am ⊆ Bm \ (∪0≤j≤m−1(Aj ∪Dj)) such that
|Am| = w − (m− 1)d wbt2/4c+ ted
t
2
e − (m− 1)d wbt2/4c+ te.
If |Am| = 0, let C(m) = ∅. If not, we deal with the above two cases separately.
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For case (a), m = b t2c+ 1, 0 < |Am| ≤ d wbt2/4c+ted t2e. With the assumption,
Am can be covered by at most d t2e distinct blocks in B other than Bm. Denote
C(m) ⊆ B \ {Bm} such that |C(m)| ≤ d t2e and Am ⊆
⋃
B∈C(m) B.
For case (b), m ≤ b t2c, 0 < |Am| < d wbt2/4c+te(d t2e + 1). With the assumption,
Am can be covered by at most d t2e+ 1 distinct blocks in B other than Bm. Denote
C(m) ⊆ B \ {Bm} such that |C(m)| ≤ d t2e+ 1 ≤ t−m+ 1 and Am ⊆
⋃
B∈C(m) B.
Now, we have already taken m ≤ b t2c+ 1 distinct blocks B1, . . . , Bm ∈ B. De-
note
T =
⋃
0≤j≤m−1
(Aj ∪Dj) ∪Am.
Clearly, T ⊆ X and |T | = w. Moreover,
T ⊆
⋃
1≤j≤m
Bj ,
that is, P0 := {B1, . . . , Bm} ∈ Pt(T ).
On the other hand, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
T ⊆ (
⋃
B∈C(i)
B) ∪ (
⋃
1≤j≤m,
j 6=i
Bj),
that is, each Pi := C(i)∪{Bj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m, j 6= i} ⊆ B is a parent set of T . Moreover,
|Pi| ≤ t. That is,
{P0,P1, . . . ,Pm} ⊆ Pt(T ).
However, ⋂
0≤i≤m
Pi = ∅,
which implies ⋂
P∈Pt(T )
P = ∅.
Hence (X ,B) is not a t-IPPS(w, v), a contradiction to the assumption. Therefore
the lemma follows. 
Proof of Theorem 5.3.1. Suppose (X ,B) is a t-IPPS(w, v). By Lemma 5.3.2,
there exists one block B ∈ B which contains at least one d wbt2/4c+te-own-subset.
Delete this B from B. The resulting B \ {B} is still a t-IPPS(w, v). Applying
Lemma 5.3.2 repeatedly, we can successively delete blocks, which contain at least
one d wbt2/4c+te-own-subset, from the newly obtained t-IPPS(w, v). Note that there
are
(
v
d wbt2/4c+t e
)
distinct d wbt2/4c+te-subsets from X , and each d wbt2/4c+te-subset, as
own-subset of some block, can be deleted at most once. Hence
|B| ≤
(
v
d wbt2/4c+te
)
,
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and the theorem follows. 
In the following, we give examples to compare the new upper bound with the
known result for t-IPPS.
Example 5.3.3 Let t = 2 and w = 7. The following Figure 5.2 shows the improve-
ments of the new bound for 2-IPPS(7, v), where 20 ≤ v ≤ 50.
Figure 5.2: A comparison between the known and new upper bounds for 2-IPPS(7, v)
Example 5.3.4 Let t = 2. A comparison between the known upper bound in Theo-
rem 5.2.3 and our new upper bound in Theorem 5.3.1 for 2-IPPS(w, v) is shown in
Figure 5.3, where 2 ≤ w ≤ 10, 10 ≤ v ≤ 30.
Figure 5.3: A comparison between the known and new upper bounds for 2-
IPPS(w, v)
As can be seen, the known upper bound O(vd
w
bt2/4c+dt/2e e) in Theorem 5.2.3 is im-
proved to O(vd
w
bt2/4c+t e) in Theorem 5.3.1, which is a significant difference especially
for fixed t, w and sufficiently large v.
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Recall that in the proof of Lemma 5.3.2, we tried to construct a suitable T for
which Pt(T ) is a configuration. Note that the configuration {P0,P1, . . . ,Pm}, where
m ≤ b t2c+ 1, satisfies that
|
⋃
0≤i≤m
Pi| ≤ m+ d t
2
e(m− 1) + (t−m+ 1) ≤ b( t
2
+ 1)2c,
which implies that {P0,P1, . . . ,Pm} is probably a minimal configuration by Lemma
5.1.3. Moreover, we have the following conjecture.
Conjecture 5.3.5 Let v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ 2 be positive integers. The new upper bound(
v
d wbt2/4c+t e
)
is the exact upper bound for t-IPPS(w, v), up to a constant depending
only on w and t.
The above discussion shows that the anti-collusion key-distributing scheme based
on a t-IPPS(w, v) can accommodate at most
(
v
d wbt2/4c+t e
)
users, which may be the
exact maximum number of users it can hold, hopefully. In the next section, we
provide a positive answer to this conjecture for certain cases.
5.4 A probabilistic lower bound for t-IPPS
In this section, we show a lower bound for t-IPPS with the probabilistic expurgation
method.
First, according to Definition 5.1.4, we have the following description of the
forbidden configuration in an IPPS. Let (X ,B) be a t-IPPS(w, v). A (minimal)
forbidden configuration F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} in B is a (minimal) configuration in B
such that
|(
⋃
B∈F1
B) ∩ (
⋃
B∈F2
B) ∩ · · · ∩ (
⋃
B∈Fm
B)| ≥ w.
Therefore we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4.1 In a t-IPPS(w, v), if a minimal forbidden configuration contains s
blocks, where 2 ≤ s ≤ u, then it is spanned by at most (s− 1)w points, that is,
|
⋃
B∈U(F)
B| = |
⋃
1≤i≤m
(
⋃
B∈Fi
B)| ≤ (s− 1)w.
Proof: Suppose F = {F1, . . . ,Fm} is a minimal forbidden configuration with size
|U(F)| = s. Then there exists a w-subset W ⊆ X such that
W ⊆
⋃
B∈Fi
B, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
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Thus each point inW appears in at least two distinct blocks of U(F), since if not, it
contradicts that F is a configuration. From |U(F)| = s, we know that F is spanned
by at most sw points. Thus
|
⋃
B∈U(F)
B| = |W |+ |
⋃
B∈U(F)
(B \W )| ≤ w + (s− 2)w = (s− 1)w,
as desired. 
Combining Theorem 5.1.5 and Lemma 5.4.1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4.2 If a set system (X ,B) is not a t-IPPS(w, v), then there exists an
s-subset U ⊆ B, 2 ≤ s ≤ u, such that U is spanned by at most (s− 1)w points.
For convenience, we define the bad s-packet as follows.
Definition 5.4.3 An s-subset U ⊆ (Xw), 2 ≤ s ≤ u, is called a bad s-packet if it is
spanned by at most (s− 1)w points.
Now we are going to prove the existence of good t-IPPS(w, v) for fixed w and
sufficiently large v. From Lemma 5.4.1, we will show that bad s-packets are not
typical and therefore their probability is small by using the technique similar to
random coding. The process of deriving a lower bound for t-IPPS in Theorem 5.4.4
is to first randomly choose a family of blocks from
(X
w
)
, and then remove one block
from each bad s-packet, 2 ≤ s ≤ u, which may form a possible minimal forbidden
configuration.
Theorem 5.4.4 Let w and t be fixed positive integers such that t ≥ 2. Then there
exists a constant c, depending only on w and t, with the following property. For any
sufficiently large integer v, there exists a t-IPPS(w, v) with size at least cv
w
u−1 .
Proof: Let X be a finite set of v points. Let (Xw) be the collection of all w-subsets
(blocks) B ⊆ X . Form a random subset B ⊆ (Xw) of blocks by including each block
independently with probability p, where 0 < p < 1. We will determine the value of
p later.
Let V denote the number of blocks in B. Clearly, E(V ) = (vw)p.
Let X denote the number of all bad s-packets, 2 ≤ s ≤ u, in B.
For any s-subset U ⊆ (Xw), 2 ≤ s ≤ u, let X(U) be the indicator random variable
for the event U ⊆ B. Then
Pr(X(U)) = ps
as all s blocks in U must be chosen to be in B.
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So, by the linearity of expectation,
E(X) =
∑
U is a bad s-packet in
(X
w
)
,
2≤s≤u
Pr(X(U))
=
∑
2≤s≤u
Nsp
s,
(5.1)
where Ns is the number of bad s-packets in
(X
w
)
.
For each 2 ≤ s ≤ u, we have
Ns ≤
(
v
(s− 1)w
)(((s−1)w
w
)
s
)
. (5.2)
Indeed, since each bad s-packet is spanned by at most (s−1)w points, so any (s−1)w
points in X may generate up to (((s−1)ww )s ) bad s-packets in X . There are ( v(s−1)w)
distinct subsets of size (s− 1)w in X . The inequality (5.2) for Ns follows.
From (5.1) and (5.2),
E(X) ≤
∑
2≤s≤u
(
v
(s− 1)w
)(((s−1)w
w
)
s
)
ps.
So, again by the linearity of expectation,
E(V −X) = E(V )− E(X)
≥
(
v
w
)
p−
∑
2≤s≤u
(
v
(s− 1)w
)(((s−1)w
w
)
s
)
ps.
(5.3)
Take p = c0v
(2−u)w
u−1 , where c0 is a constant chosen appropriately and depending
only on w and t. Note that for fixed w, t and sufficiently large v, the value of p
always can be chosen such that 0 < p < 1. Then for (5.3) and sufficiently large v,
we have
E(V −X) ≥ c1vwp− c2v(u−1)wpu − c3
∑
2≤s≤u−1
v(s−1)wps
≥ c0c1vwv
(2−u)w
u−1 − cu0c2v(u−1)wv
(2−u)uw
u−1 − cu−10 c3
≥ cv wu−1 ,
where c1, c2, c3 and c are constants depending only on w and t.
Thus, there exists at least one point in the probability space for which the
difference V −X is at least cv wu−1 . That is, there is a family of blocks B which has
at least cv
w
u−1 more blocks than bad s-packets, 2 ≤ s ≤ u. Delete one block from
each bad s-packets, 2 ≤ s ≤ u, in B, leaving a set B′. This set B′ does not contain
any bad s-packets, 2 ≤ s ≤ u, and has at least cv wu−1 blocks.
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Thus the theorem follows by Corollary 5.4.2. 
We remark that the lower bound for t-IPPS(w, v) in Theorem 5.4.4 has order
of magnitude wu−1 =
w
bt2/4c+t , which is extremely close to the order of magnitude
d wbt2/4c+te of the upper bound in Theorem 5.3.1. Particularly, when bt2/4c + t is a
divisor of w, the expurgation method provides asymptotically optimal t-IPPS(w, v)
in the sense that
lim
v→∞
logv It(w, v)
w
=
1
bt2/4c+ t
meets the upper bound of Theorem 5.3.1. This is also a positive answer to Conjecture
5.3.5 for certain cases.
5.5 t-IPPS with small t and w
In the preceding section, we provided a probabilistic existence lower bound for t-
IPPS(w, v) with general t and w. In this section, we pay attention to t-IPPS(w, v)
for the case of t = 2, 3, small positive integer w, and v ≥ w. We aim to determine
the exact value of It(w, v) in these cases.
5.5.1 Bounds for 2-IPPS with w = 2, 3
First, considering a 2-IPPS(w, v), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5.1 A (w, v) set system (X ,B) is a 2-IPPS(w, v) if and only if the fol-
lowing cases hold:
(IPPSa) For any three distinct blocks A,B,C ∈ B, we have
|(A ∪B) ∩ (A ∪ C) ∩ (B ∪ C)| < w.
(IPPSb) For any four distinct blocks A,B,C,D ∈ B, we have
|(A ∪B) ∩ (C ∪D)| < w.
Proof: From Theorem 5.1.5, a (w, v) set system (X ,B) is not a 2-IPPS(w, v) if and
only if there exists a minimal forbidden configuration in C with size at most 4. Since
any two blocks in B are different, we only need to consider the minimal forbidden
configuration in B with size 3 and 4. If there exists a minimal forbidden configuration
in B with size 3, say A,B,C, then the configuration F = {{A,B}, {A,C}, {B,C}}
should be forbidden, which is the opposite side of (IPPSa). Similarly, the minimal
forbidden configuration in B with size 4 is the opposite side of (IPPSb). The lemma
follows. 
By virtue of a construction for traceability schemes from sunflowers in Theorem
4.3.1, we have
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Lemma 5.5.2 For any v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ 2, we have
It(w, v) ≥ v − w + 1.
Proof: By Corollary 3.2.5 (1) and Theorem 4.3.1, we have
It(w, v) ≥Mt(w, v) ≥ v − w + 1,
as desired. 
The following corollary follows from Lemma 5.5.2 and Theorem 5.3.1.
Corollary 5.5.3 For any v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ 2 such that w ≤ bt2/4c+ t, we have
v − w + 1 ≤ It(w, v) ≤ v.
We start from the first non-trivial case, that is, t = 2 and w = 2.
Theorem 5.5.4 For any v ≥ 2, we have I2(2, v) = v − 1.
Proof: From Corollary 5.5.3, we have v − 1 ≤ I2(2, v) ≤ v. It suffices to prove
I2(2, v) < v. Suppose not, and (X ,B) is a 2-IPPS(2, v) with size v. We aim to find
a contradiction to the definition of IPPS.
First, there exists one point x ∈ X such that x appears in at least two distinct
blocks, since d2vv e = 2. That is,
2 ≤ |{B ∈ B : x ∈ B}| := b(x) ≤ v − 1.
Then there exists another point y ∈ X\{x} such that y appears in at least two blocks,
since d2v−b(x)−1v−1 e = 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that A,B ∈ B are two
distinct blocks containing x, and C,D ∈ B are two distinct blocks containing y.
Note that {A,B} 6= {C,D}. If |{A,B,C,D}| = 3, then, without loss of generality,
assume A = C = {x, y}. It implies A ⊆ B ∪ D, a contradiction to Lemma 5.5.1
(IPPSa). If |{A,B,C,D}| = 4, then {x, y} ⊆ (A∪C)∩ (B ∪D), a contradiction to
Lemma 5.5.1 (IPPSb). Thus I2(2, v) < v and the lemma follows.

A direct corollary from Theorem 5.5.4 is as follows.
Corollary 5.5.5 For any v ≥ 2, t ≥ 2, we have It(2, v) = v − 1.
For w ≥ 3, we have the following observation.
Proposition 5.5.6 Let v ≥ w ≥ 3 and (X ,B) be a 2-IPPS(w, v). If there exist two
distinct blocks A,B ∈ B such that |A ∩B| = w − 1, then |B| ≤ v − w + 1.
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Proof: With the assumption, we first claim that for any point x ∈ X \ (A ∩ B),
x is contained in at most one block in B. Suppose not, then there exists one point
x0 ∈ X \ (A ∩ B) contained in two blocks C,D ∈ B. Clearly, {A,B} 6= {C,D}. If
|{A,B,C,D}| = 3, then, without loss of generality, assume A = C. It implies that
any two blocks of A,B,D can generate a w-subset (A∩B)∪{x0}, a contradiction to
Lemma 5.5.1 (IPPSa). If |{A,B,C,D}| = 4, then (A∩B)∪{x0} ⊆ (A∪C)∩(B∪D),
a contradiction to Lemma 5.5.1 (IPPSb). Thus the claim follows.
Based on the above claim, B with the maximum number of blocks is from the
construction in Lemma 5.5.2 (actually Theorem 4.3.1), where ∆ = A∩B. It implies
|B| ≤ v − w + 1, as desired. 
Here we remark that if one would like to explore the exact value of I2(w, v),
v ≥ w ≥ 3, the first step may need to analyze the set system with block size w and
max{|B1 ∩B2| : B1, B2 ∈ B, B1 6= B2} ≤ w − 2.
5.5.2 An upper bound for 2-IPPS(4, v): A graph theoretic approach
In this subsection, we consider the case t = 2 and w = 4. By Theorem 5.4.4 and
Theorem 5.3.1, for sufficiently large v, we have
cv4/3 ≤ I2(4, v) ≤ 1
2
v2,
where c is a positive constant. One interesting problem is to determine the order of
magnitude of the size of 2-IPPS(4, v). In the following, we prove
Theorem 5.5.7 I2(4, v) = o(v2).
Before we prove Theorem 5.5.7, we do some preparations. First, by Corollary
5.5.6, we have
Corollary 5.5.8 Let (X ,B) be a 2-IPPS(4, v). If there exist two distinct blocks
B1, B2 ∈ B such that |B1 ∩B2| = 3, then |B| ≤ v − 3.
To prove Theorem 5.5.7, we have to consider the 2-IPPS(4, v) (X ,B) where
max{|B1 ∩B2| : B1, B2 ∈ B, B1 6= B2} ≤ 2,
since the case in Corollary 5.5.8 has already satisfied Theorem 5.5.7.
Moreover, we have the following obvious observation.
Proposition 5.5.9 In a set system (X ,B), the number of blocks in B that contains
at least one 1-own-subset is at most v.
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The above proposition shows that for any set system (X ,B), one can remove at
most v blocks from B to satisfy that each of the remaining blocks in B does not
contain any 1-own-subset. In the following discussion, we may assume that a set
system (X ,B) such that
• max{|B1 ∩B2| : B1, B2 ∈ B, B1 6= B2} ≤ 2,
• for any B ∈ B and any x ∈ B, there exists B′ ∈ B \ {B} such that x ∈ B′.
(5.4)
We also have the following observation.
Proposition 5.5.10 Let (X ,B) be a 2-IPPS(4, v). If there exist two distinct blocks
B1, B2 ∈ B such that |B1∩B2| = 2, then there does not exist B′ ∈ B\{B1, B2} such
that Bi \ (B1 ∩B2) ⊆ B′, where i = 1, 2.
Proof: Suppose not, that is there exists B′ ∈ B\{B1, B2} such that B1\(B1∩B2) ⊆
B′. Then B1 ⊆ (B2 ∪B′), a contradiction to Lemma 5.5.1 (IPPSa). 
What is more, we have
Lemma 5.5.11 Let (X ,B) be a 2-IPPS(4, v) such that (5.4). Then
|{B ∈ B : ∃B′ ∈ B \ {B} such that |B ∩B′| = 2}| ≤ v − 1. (5.5)
Proof: Suppose on the contrary that the left-hand side of (5.5) is no less than v.
Then we would like to find a contradiction to that {X ,B} is a 2-IPPS(4, v).
To this end, we construct a graph G = (X , E), where X is the vertex-set and
E is the edge-set. For each B ∈ {B ∈ B : ∃B′ ∈ B \ {B} s.t. |B ∩ B′| = 2},
the 2-subset B \ (B ∩ B′) forms an edge in E , where B′ is a block in B \ {B} such
that |B ∩ B′| = 2. Note that a block B may contribute more than one edge to E .
From Proposition 5.5.10, we have that any edge in E only belongs to one block in
B and any two edges in E arising from the same block are adjacent. According to
the assumption, we have |E| ≥ v. That is, G is a graph on a v-vertex-set containing
more than v − 1 edges. By Lemma 2.2.8, there exists a cycle in G. Hence there
exists a path of length 3 as Figure 5.4. If a = d, the path is a cycle of length 3.
Figure 5.4: A path of length 3
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Case 1. If a, b, c belong to the same block B ∈ B, then let B = {a, b, c, v1},
where v1 ∈ X \{a, b, c}. By the first assumption of (5.4) and the way of constructing
G, there exist B1 ∈ B \ {B} such that B ∩B1 = {c, v1}, and B2 ∈ B \ {B,B1} such
that B ∩ B2 = {a, v1}. Since any two blocks in B intersect at at most two points,
there exists a point x ∈ B1 and x /∈ B, x /∈ B2. By the second assumption of
(5.4), there exists a block B3 ∈ B \ {B,B1, B2} such that x ∈ B3. Now we have
|{a, c, v1, x}| = 4 and
{a, c, v1, x} ⊆ B ∪B3 and {a, c, v1, x} ⊆ B1 ∪B2.
However, {B,B3} and {B1, B2} are disjoint, which implies a contradiction to Lemma
5.5.1 (IPPSb).
Similarly, we can derive a contradiction to Lemma 5.5.1 when b, c, d belong to
the same block of B.
Case 2. Now we consider the case that there does not exist any block B ∈ B
such that {a, b, c} ⊆ B or {b, c, d} ⊆ B. Let B1 = {a, b, v1, v2} ∈ B, where v1 6= v2,
v1 6= a, b, c and v2 6= a, b, c. Let B2, B3 be the blocks such that {b, c} ⊆ B2 and
{c, d} ⊆ B3, respectively. Since {a, b, c} is not contained in any block of B, we have
B1 6= B2 and B1 6= B3. Since {b, c, d} is not contained in any block of B, we have
B2 6= B3. By the way of constructing G, there exists B′1 ∈ B \ {B1} such that
B′1 ∩B1 = {v1, v2}. Then B′1 6= B2 follows from the first assumption of (5.4). Now
we have |{b, c, v1, v2}| = 4 and
{b, c, v1, v2} ⊆ B1 ∪B2, {b, c, v1, v2} ⊆ B1 ∪B3 and {b, c, v1, v2} ⊆ B′1 ∪B2.
If B′1 = B3, then {b, c, v1, v2} can be generated by any two of B1, B2, B3, a con-
tradiction to Lemma 5.5.1 (IPPSa). If B′1 6= B3, then {B1, B3} and {B′1, B2} are
disjoint but both of them can generate {b, c, v1, v2}, a contradiction to Lemma 5.5.1
(IPPSb).
This completes the proof. 
Now we are going to prove Theorem 5.5.7 by virtue of the well-known graph
removal lemma. A special case of Lemma 2.2.9, where H = Kk, was also shown by
Alon, Duke, Lefmann, Rödl and Yuster in [3].
Lemma 5.5.12 ([3]) For every γ > 0 and every positive integer k, there exists a
constant δ = δ(k, γ) > 0 such that every graph G on n vertices, containing less than
δnk copies of the complete graph Kk on k vertices, contains a set of less than γn2
edges whose deletion destroys all copies of Kk in G.
Now we prove Theorem 5.5.7 by means of Lemma 5.5.12.
Proof of Theorem 5.5.7. Proving Theorem 5.5.7 is equivalent to proving
that for any ε > 0, there exists v0 = v0(ε) such that for any v > v0, we have
I2(4, v) < εv
2.
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Suppose (X ,B) is a 2-IPPS(4, v) of size M . If there exist two distinct blocks
B1, B2 ∈ B such that |B1 ∩ B2| = 3, then Corollary 5.5.8 ensures that M ≤ v − 3,
which implies I2(4, v) = o(v2). So we need only consider the case that max{|B1 ∩
B2| : B1, B2 ∈ B, B1 6= B2} ≤ 2.
First, by Proposition 5.5.9 and Lemma 5.5.11, we can remove at most 2v blocks
from B to make the remaining B′ satisfy that any block does not contain any 1-own-
subset and any two blocks intersect at at most one point. Clearly, |B′| ≤ |B| = M
and |B′| ≥ |B| − 2v = M − 2v.
Now we construct a graph G = (X , E) by the following way: for each B ∈ B′,
any 2-subset of B forms an edge in E . Obviously, any block contributes (42) = 6
edges, which actually form a copy of the complete graph K4. Since any two distinct
blocks in B′ intersect at at most one point, thus any two copies of K4 in G that arise
from two distinct blocks are edge-disjoint. Hence, |E| ≥ 6(M − 2v). Accordingly,
one needs to delete at least M − 2v edges from E to destroy all copies of complete
graph K4 in G.
Assume that for sufficiently large v, we have M ≥ εv2 for some ε > 0. Then we
need to delete at least M − 2v ≥ ε2v2 edges from E to destroy all copies of K4 in G.
By Lemma 5.5.12, let k = 4 and γ = ε2 , we should have that G contains at least δv
4
copies of K4, where δ = δ(ε) is a positive constant.
For these copies of K4 in G, the number of copies of K4 which contain at least
two edges arising from the same block in B′ is O(v3). Indeed, by an upper bound of
2-IPPS(4, v) in Theorem 5.3.1 that M ≤ (v2), there are at most (v2) ways to choose
a block in B′, and (62) = 15 ways to choose two edges from that block. The above
process decides at least three vertices and there are at most v − 3 ways to choose
another vertex to form a copy of K4. Thus O(v3) follows.
Since G contains at least δv4 copies of K4, there exists a copy of K4 in which any
two edges come from two different blocks. Denote one such copy of K4 as Figure
5.5. We can suppose that B1, B2, B3, B4 ∈ B′ are four distinct blocks such that
Figure 5.5: A copy of K4
{a, b} ⊆ B1, {a, c} ⊆ B2, {b, d} ⊆ B3 and {c, d} ⊆ B4. Now we have |{a, b, c, d}| = 4
and
{a, b, c, d} ⊆ B1 ∪B4 and {a, b, c, d} ⊆ B2 ∪B3.
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However, {B1, B4} and {B2, B3} are disjoint, which implies a contradiction to Lem-
ma 5.5.1 (IPPSb).
Thus for any ε > 0 and sufficiently large v, we have M < εv2, as desired. 
In the next subsection, we will prove a similar upper bound for 3-IPPS(6, v) by
using the graph removal lemma.
5.5.3 An upper bound for 3-IPPS(6, v)
By Theorem 5.3.1 and Theorem 5.4.4, we have
cv6/5 ≤ I3(6, v) ≤ 1
6
v2,
where c is a positive constant. In this subsection, by a similar way as the argument
of Theorem 5.5.7, we prove a better upper bound for 3-IPPS(6, v) as follows.
Theorem 5.5.13 I3(6, v) = o(v2).
Before we go to the proof of Theorem 5.5.13, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5.14 Let (X ,B) be a 3-IPPS(6, v). If there exist two distinct blocks
A,B ∈ B such that |A ∩B| ≥ 2, then |B| = o(v2).
Proof: Suppose on the contrary that, under the assumption, there exists ε > 0
such that for sufficiently large v, |B| ≥ εv2.
By the assumption, there are two points {a, b} ⊆ A ∩ B. Now we would like to
remove some points from each block of B to obtain a truncated set system. For each
block B ∈ B \ {A,B},
• if {a, b} ⊆ B, then we remove a, b from B, obtaining B′;
• if a (or b) exists in B, then we first remove a (or b) and another arbitrary
point from B, obtaining B′;
• if {a, b} * B, then we remove any two points from B, obtaining B′.
From the above process, we obtain a set system (X ,B′) such that for any B′ ∈ B′,
|B′| = 4.
We first claim that B′ is not a multi-set. Suppose not, then there exist two
distinct blocks C,D ∈ B such that |(C ∩D) \ {a, b}| ≥ 4. Then (C ∩D) ∪ {a, b} ⊆
(A∪C)∩ (B ∪D), a contradiction to the assumption that (X ,B) is a 3-IPPS(6, v).
Thus any two blocks in B′ are distinct, which implies that each B′ ∈ B′ corresponds
to a block B ∈ B.
By the assumption, we have |B′| ≥ εv2− 2. Then from Theorem 5.5.7, we know
that (X ,B′) is not a 2-IPPS(4, v). Then we have the following two possible cases.
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• If there exist three distinct blocks C ′, D′, E′ ∈ B′ such that any two of them
can generate the same 4-subset T ′ ⊆ X \ {a, b}, denote C,D,E ∈ B as the
corresponding blocks of C ′, D′ and E′. Then any triple in
{A,C,D}, {A,C,E}, {A,D,E}, {B,C,D}, {B,C,E}, {B,D,E}
can generate the same 6-subset T ′ ∪ {a, b}. But their intersection is empty,
which contradicts the definition of 3-IPPS(6, v).
• If there exist four distinct blocks C ′, D′, E′, F ′ ∈ B such that {C,D} and
{E,F} can generate the same 4-subset T ′ ⊆ X \ {a, b}, denote C,D,E, F ∈
B as the corresponding blocks of C ′, D′, E′ and F ′. Then {A,C,D} and
{B,E, F} can generate the same 6-subset T ′∪{a, b}. But {A,C,D}∩{B,E, F}
= ∅, which contradicts the definition of 3-IPPS(6, v).
Thus for any ε > 0 and sufficiently large v, |B| < εv2, establishing the lemma.

Now we are going to prove Theorem 5.5.13.
Proof of Theorem 5.5.13. Let (X ,B) be a 3-IPPS(6, v). If there exist two
blocks in B intersecting at at least two points, then by Lemma 5.5.14, we have
|B| = o(v2). Hence in the following, we assume that for any two distinct blocks
A,B ∈ B, |A ∩B| ≤ 1.
We aim to prove |B| = o(v2). Suppose on the contrary that there exists a
constant ε > 0 such that for sufficiently large v, |B| ≥ εv2. We would like to find a
contradiction to the assumption that (X ,B) is a 3-IPPS(6, v).
First, we construct a graph G = (X , E). For any block B ∈ B, any 2-subset of
B forms an edge in E . Thus a block B ∈ B contributes to a copy of K6 in G. By
the assumption that any two distinct blocks intersect at at most one point, we have
that any two copies of K6 generated from two distinct blocks are edge-disjoint.
Then we need to delete at least εv2 edges from E to destroy all copies of K6 in
G. By Lemma 5.5.12, let k = 6 and γ = ε2 , we should have that G contains at least
δv6 copies of K6, where δ = δ(ε) is a positive constant.
For these copies of K6 in G, the number of copies of K6 which contain at least
two edges arising from the same block in B is O(v5). Indeed, by an upper bound of
2-IPPS(6, v) in Theorem 5.3.1 that |B| ≤ (v2), there are at most (v2) ways to choose
a block in B, and (152 ) ways to choose two edges from that block. The above process
decides at least three vertices and there are at most (v−3)3 ways to choose another
three vertices to form a copy of K6. Thus O(v5) follows.
Since G contains at least δv6 copies of K6, there exists a copy of K6 in which any
two edges come from two different blocks. Denote one such copy of K6 as Figure
5.6.
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Figure 5.6: A copy of K6
We can suppose that A,B,C,D,E, F ∈ B are six distinct blocks such that
{a, b} ⊆ A, {c, d} ⊆ B, {e, f} ⊆ C, {a, f} ⊆ D, {b, c} ⊆ E and {d, e} ⊆ F . Now we
have |{a, b, c, d, e, f}| = 6 and
{a, b, c, d, e, f} ⊆ A ∪B ∪ C and {a, b, c, d, e, f} ⊆ D ∪ E ∪ F.
However, {A,B,C} ∩ {D,E, F} = ∅ implies a contradiction to the definition of
3-IPPS(6, v).
Thus for any ε > 0 and sufficiently large v, we have |B| < εv2, as desired. 
We remark that for t ≥ 4 and w = b( t2 + 1)2c, we may cannot have a similar
argument as that of Theorem 5.5.7. Since in a graph, we can only get 2t vertices
from t distinct edges, and the fact w = b( t2 + 1)2c > 2t for any t ≥ 4 implies that 2t
vertices are not enough to form a w-subset. But we believe that this obstacle can
be removed by virtue of hypergraphs or some elaborate analyses. Precisely, we have
the following conjecture.
Conjecture 5.5.15 Suppose t ≥ 4 is a positive integer, then
It(w, v) = o(v
2),
where w = b( t2 + 1)2c.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated IPPSs. First, to unify many combinatorial struc-
tures with the parent-identifying property in such as digital fingerprinting and group
testing, we proposed a unified concept of parent-identifying schemes in Section 5.1.
An equivalent relationship between parent-identifying schemes and forbidden config-
urations was established. We also corresponded the problems for parent-identifying
schemes to a kind of Turán-type problems.
Next, we showed a new upper bound for t-IPPS by virtue of techniques in ex-
tremal set theory in Section 5.3, which greatly improve the previously known bound.
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Moreover, we proved a lower bound for t-IPPS with the probabilistic methods in
Section 5.4, which has the same order of magnitude with the new upper bound in
Section 5.3 for certain cases. Furthermore, in Section 5.5, we gave some bounds for
2-IPPS with small block size w. Particularly, better upper bounds for 2-IPPS(4, v)
and 3-IPPS(6, v) were provided by means of the famous graph removal lemma in
extremal graph theory, respectively.
Although we improved the known results by presenting new bounds on the size
of IPPS in this chapter, to determine the exact maximum size of a t-IPPS(w, v) for
the specific parameters t, w and v is still far from being solved.
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Chapter 6
Union-Intersection-Bounded
Families
In this chapter, we investigate a special kind of CFF due to its applications in
broadcast encryption, called union-intersection-bounded family (UIBF). In Section
6.1, we show some properties of UIBF. An upper bound for general (s, t; d)-UIBF is
proved in Section 6.2.1 by means of techniques in extremal set theory. With a result
of CFF by Erdős, Frankl and Füredi in [39], we also provide a better upper bound
for (1, t; d)-UIBF in Section 6.2.2. A probabilistic lower bound for (s, t; d)-UIBF is
exhibited in Section 6.3. We make a summary of this chapter in Section 6.4. This
chapter is based on results in [52].
6.1 Properties
The definition of UIBF was given in Definition 3.1.1. In this section, we provide
some properties of UIBF. First, we have
Proposition 6.1.1 Let v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ s ≥ 1 and d ≤ w be positive integers. Then
we have the following relationships:
(1) An (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v) is an (s, t− 1; d)-UIBF(w, v).
(2) An (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v) is an (s− 1, t; d)-UIBF(w, v).
(3) An (s, t; d− 1)-UIBF(w, v) is an (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v).
(4) An (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v) is an s-CFF(w, v).
(5) An (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v) is a t-CFF(w, v).
Proof: For (1), we prove by assuming the opposite. Assume (X ,B) is not an
(s, t−1; d)-UIBF(w, v). Then by the definition, there exist s+(t−1) distinct blocks
A1, . . . , As, B1, . . . , Bt−1 ∈ B such that
|(
⋃
1≤i≤s
Ai) ∩ (
⋃
1≤j≤t−1
Bj)| ≥ d.
By arbitrarily choosing a block Bt ∈ B\{A1, . . . , As, B1, . . . , Bt−1}, we directly have
|(
⋃
1≤i≤s
Ai) ∩ (
⋃
1≤j≤t
Bj)| ≥ d,
which implies that (X ,B) is not an (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v). Thus (1) follows.
The relationship (2) can be proved in a similar way, and we omit its proof. The
relationship (3) is obvious. The relationship (4) follows from (1) and (3). The
relationship (5) follows from (2) and (3). 
Consequently, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 6.1.2 Let v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ s ≥ 1 and d ≤ w be positive integers. Then
(1) Us,t(w, v; d) ≤ Us,t−1(w, v; d);
(2) Us,t(w, v; d) ≤ Us−1,t(w, v; d);
(3) Us,t(w, v; d− 1) ≤ Us,t(w, v; d).
6.2 Upper bounds for (s, t; d)-UIBF
In this section, we provide an upper bound for general Us,t(w, v; d) and a better
upper bound for U1,t(w, v; d).
6.2.1 An upper bound for general UIBF
In this subsection, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2.1 Let v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ s ≥ 1 and d ≤ w be positive integers. We have
Us,t(w, v; d) ≤
(
v
d ds+t−1e
)
.
To prove this upper bound, we use the notion own-subset. For any (s, t; d)-UIBF,
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2.2 In an (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v), there exists one block containing at least
one d ds+t−1e-own-subset.
Proof: Suppose (X ,B) is an (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v) over a finite set X , where |X | = v.
Assume on the contrary that for any B ∈ B, B does not contain any d ds+t−1e-
own-subset. We would like to derive a contraction with that (X ,B) is an (s, t; d)-
UIBF(w, v). Explicitly, we aim to find out s+t distinct blocksA1, . . . , As, B1, . . . , Bt ∈
B such that
|(
⋃
1≤i≤s
Ai) ∩ (
⋃
1≤j≤t
Bj)| ≥ d. (6.1)
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First, arbitrarily choose one block A1 ∈ B. Let i = 1 and A0 = B0 = D0 = E0 = ∅.
Next turn to execute a while loop.
While i < s, we do the following three steps.
Step 1. Take a d ds+t−1e-subset Di ⊆ Ai \
⋃
0≤j<i(Dj ∪ Ej) such that
Di *
⋃
0≤j<i
Aj and Di *
⋃
0≤j<i
Bj .
We claim that Di is available. Indeed, if this kind of Di is not available, it
would imply that there does not exist any d ds+t−1e-subset in (Ai \
⋃
0≤j<i(Dj∪
Ej)) \
⋃
0≤j<iAj , or that there does not exist any d ds+t−1e-subset in (Ai \⋃
0≤j<i(Dj∪Ej))\
⋃
0≤j<iBj . Without loss of generality, we may assume that
there does not exist any d ds+t−1e-subset in (Ai \
⋃
0≤j<i(Dj ∪Ej))\
⋃
0≤j<iAj .
Equivalently,
0 ≤ |(Ai \
⋃
0≤j<i
(Dj ∪ Ej)) \
⋃
0≤j<i
Aj | < d d
s+ t− 1e.
Then with the assumption that Ai does not contain any d ds+t−1e-own-subset,
we could take a block A? ∈ B \ {A1, . . . , Ai} such that
((Ai \
⋃
0≤j<i
(Dj ∪ Ej)) \
⋃
0≤j<i
Aj) ⊆ A?.
This would imply thatAi can be covered by i+1 ≤ s blocksA1, . . . , Ai−1, Bi−1, A?,
contradicting Proposition 6.1.1 (4). Thus the required Di is available.
Next, with the assumption that Ai does not contain any d ds+t−1e-own-subset,
we take a block Bi ∈ B\{A1, . . . , Ai, B1, . . . , Bi−1} such that Di ⊆ Bi. Then
turn to Step 2.
Step 2. Take a d ds+t−1e-subset Ei ⊆ Bi \
⋃
0≤j<i(Dj ∪ Ej ∪Di) such that
Ei *
⋃
0≤j≤i
Aj and Ei *
⋃
0≤j<i
Bj .
This Ei is available, which can be argued in a similar way as that Di in Step
1 is available.
By the assumption that Bi does not contain any d ds+t−1e-own-subset, we take
a block Ai+1 ∈ B\{A1, . . . , Ai, B1, . . . , Bi} such that Ei ⊆ Ai+1. Then turn
to Step 3.
Step 3. Let i = i+ 1. Then continue to execute this while loop.
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After the above loop, we have taken A1, . . . , As, B1, . . . , Bs−1 ∈ B. Now we
explain how to choose Bs, Bs+1, . . . , Bt−1. We also execute a while loop. Now i = s.
Let Ê :=
⋃
0≤j<sEj .
While i < t, take a d ds+t−1e-subset Di ⊆ As \
⋃
0≤j<i(Dj ∪ Ê) such that
Di *
⋃
0≤j<s
Aj and Di *
⋃
0≤j<i
Bj .
This Di is available, which can be argued in a similar way, by virtue of Propo-
sition 6.1.1 (5), as that the above D1, . . . , Ds−1 are available. By the assump-
tion that As does not contain any d ds+t−1e-own-subset, we can take a block Bi ∈
B\{A1, . . . , As, B1, . . . , Bi−1} such that Di ⊆ Bi. Then let i = i + 1 and continue
the while loop.
After this while loop, we have taken A1, . . . , As, B1, . . . , Bt−1 ∈ B. Next we
choose the last block Bt. First, by Proposition 6.1.1 (5), we know that As can not
be covered by any other t blocks. Thus
As \
⋃
0≤j<t
(Dj∪Ê) *
⋃
0≤j<s
Aj ,
As \
⋃
0≤j<t
(Dj∪Ê) *
⋃
0≤j<t
Bj ,
|As \
⋃
0≤j<t
(Dj∪Ê)| = k − (s+ t− 2)d d
s+ t− 1e.
Then we take a subset Dt ⊆ As \
⋃
0≤j<t(Dj ∪ Ê) such that
Dt ∩ (As \
⋃
0≤j<s
Aj) 6= ∅,
Dt ∩ (As \
⋃
0≤j<t
Bj) 6= ∅,
d− (s+ t− 2)d d
s+ t− 1e ≤|Dt| ≤ d
d
s+ t− 1e.
With the assumption, there exists a block Bt ∈ B \ {A1, . . . , As, B1, . . . , Bt−1} such
that Dt ⊆ Bt.
Until now, we have finally taken s+ t distinct blocks A1, . . . , As, B1, . . . , Bt ∈ B
such that
Di ⊆ Ai ∩Bi, ∀ 1 ≤ i < s,
Di ⊆ As ∩Bi, ∀ s ≤ i ≤ t,
Ej ⊆ Bj ∩Aj+1, ∀ 1 ≤ j < s,
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where D1, . . . , Dt, E1, . . . , Es−1 are pairwise disjoint. Hence we have
(
⋃
1≤i≤t
Di) ∪ (
⋃
1≤j<s
Ej) ⊆ (
⋃
1≤i≤s
Ai) ∩ (
⋃
1≤j≤t
Bj)
and then
|(
⋃
1≤i≤s
Ai) ∩ (
⋃
1≤j≤t
Bj)| ≥ |(
⋃
1≤i≤t
Di) ∪ (
⋃
1≤j<s
Ej)|
=
∑
1≤i<t
|Di|+
∑
1≤j<s
|Ej |+ |Dt|
≥ (s+ t− 2)d d
s+ t− 1e+ (d− (s+ t− 2)d
d
s+ t− 1e)
= d,
which implies (6.1) and contradicts that (X ,B) is an (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v).
This completes the proof. 
Now we prove Theorem 6.2.1.
Proof of Theorem 6.2.1. Suppose (X ,B) is an (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v). By Lem-
ma 6.2.2, there exists one block B ∈ B which contains at least one d dt+s−1e-own-
subset. Delete this B from B. The resulting B \ {B} is still an (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v).
Applying Lemma 6.2.2 repeatedly, we can successively delete blocks to obtain a se-
ries of (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v)’s, each of which contains at least one d dt+s−1e-own-subset.
Note that there are
( v
d d
t+s−1 e
)
distinct d dt+s−1e-subsets from X , and each d dt+s−1e-
subset, as an own-subset of some block, can be deleted at most once. Hence
|B| ≤
(
v
d dt+s−1e
)
,
and the theorem follows. 
We remark here that for the special case s = 1, we can improve this upper bound
by exploring the number of d dt+s−1e-own-subsets possessed by each block, which will
be discussed in the next subsection.
6.2.2 A better upper bound for (1, t; d)-UIBF
The (1, t; d)-UIBF has been studied under the guise of a (t; k − d)-cover-free family
[86] and a superimposed distance code [36]. Its applications to broadcast encryption
were investigated in [48, 63] and to group testing for correcting errors in [54]. We
do not expose the detailed applications here, and the interested reader is referred
to [48, 54, 63].
In this subsection, we show a new upper bound for (1, t; d)-UIBF(w, v), which
is better than that from the general upper bound in Theorem 6.2.1. The idea to
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derive a better upper bound for (1, t; d)-UIBF is to explore the number of dd/te-
own-subsets possessed by each block. The following lemma by Erdős, Frankl and
Füredi [39] is useful.
Lemma 6.2.3 ([39]) Let F be a family of d-subsets of a ground set, and F ∈ F .
If F can not be covered by the union of any other t distinct members of F \ {F},
then F has at least
(
d−1
dd/te−1
) dd/te-own-subsets.
Hence we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2.4 Let (X ,B) be a (1, t; d)-UIBF(w, v). For any B ∈ B, the number of
dd/te-own-subsets in B is at least bwd c
(
d−1
dd/te−1
)
.
Proof: From the definition of (1, t; d)-UIBF(w, v), we have that any d-subset of B
can not be covered by the union of any other t distinct blocks in B. There are bwd c
disjoint d-subsets in B. By Lemma 6.2.3, the number of dd/te-own-subsets in B is
at least
bw
d
c
(
d− 1
dd/te − 1
)
,
as desired. 
By virtue of Lemma 6.2.4, we have
Theorem 6.2.5 Let v ≥ w ≥ 2, t ≥ 2 and d ≤ w be positive integers. We have
U1,t(w, v; d) ≤
( v
d d
t
e
)− ( wd d
t
e
)
bwd c
( d−1
d d
t
e−1
) + 1.
Proof: Suppose B is a (1, t; d)-UIBF(w, v) over X with size M . Denote ( Xdd/te) as
the collection of all dd/te-subsets of X . Clearly, |( Xdd/te)| = ( vdd/te). The following is
to double count the set {(T,B) : T ∈ ( Xdd/te), B ∈ B, T ⊆ B}. Denote
Σ := |{(T,B) : T ∈
( X
dd/te
)
, B ∈ B, T ⊆ B}|.
Then we have
Σ =
∑
T∈( Xdd/te)
∑
B∈B
s.t. T⊆B
1 =
∑
B∈B
∑
T∈( Xdd/te)
s.t. T⊆B
1.
(6.2)
On the one hand, fixing B ∈ B, we have ∑
T∈( Xdd/te)
s.t. T⊆B
1 =
(
k
dd/te
)
. Then
Σ =
∑
B∈B
(
w
dd/te
)
= M
(
w
dd/te
)
. (6.3)
On the other hand, fixing T ∈ ( Xdd/te), there are the following two possible cases.
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(a) If T is a dd/te-own-subset of some block B ∈ B, then we have ∑
B∈B
s.t. T⊆B
1 = 1.
(b) If T is not a dd/te-own-subset of any block B ∈ B, then we have ∑
B∈B
s.t. T⊆B
1 ≤M .
For any B ∈ B, denote O(B) as the collection of all dd/te-own-subsets of the
block B. By Lemma 6.2.4, we have |O(B)| ≥ bwd c
(
d−1
dd/te−1
)
. Without loss of gener-
ality, we may assume that
|
⋃
B∈B
O(B)| = Mbw
d
c
(
d− 1
dd/te − 1
)
+ σ, σ ≥ 0,
for the reason that any dd/te-own-subset is contained in exactly one block. Then
the number of T ∈ ( Xdd/te), satisfying the condition of case (b), is at most(
v
dd/te
)
−Mbw
d
c
(
d− 1
dd/te − 1
)
− σ.
Thus by the first equality of (6.2),
Σ ≤ [Mbw
d
c
(
d− 1
dd/te − 1
)
+ σ] +M [
(
v
dd/te
)
−Mbw
d
c
(
d− 1
dd/te − 1
)
− σ]
= M [
(
v
dd/te
)
−Mbw
d
c
(
d− 1
dd/te − 1
)
+ bw
d
c
(
d− 1
dd/te − 1
)
]− (M − 1)σ
≤M [
(
v
dd/te
)
−Mbw
d
c
(
d− 1
dd/te − 1
)
+ bw
d
c
(
d− 1
dd/te − 1
)
].
(6.4)
From (6.3) and (6.4), we have
M
(
w
dd/te
)
≤M [
(
v
dd/te
)
−Mbw
d
c
(
d− 1
dd/te − 1
)
+ bw
d
c
(
d− 1
dd/te − 1
)
],
which implies
M ≤
(
v
dd/te
)− ( wdd/te)
bwd c
(
d−1
dd/te−1
) + 1,
as desired. 
We remark here that when d = w, a (1, t;w)-UIBF(w, v) is exactly a t-CFF(w, v).
Its upper bound in Theorem 6.2.5 is consistent with those in [39] and Theorem 4.2.7.
6.3 A lower bound for UIBF
In this section, we show a lower bound for (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v) by virtue of the
probabilistic expurgation method.
76
Theorem 6.3.1 Let w ≥ d and t ≥ s ≥ 1 be fixed positive integers. Then there
exists a constant c, depending only on w, s and t, with the following property. For
any sufficiently large integer v, there exists an (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v) with size at least
cv
d
t+s−1 .
Proof: Let X be a finite set of v points. Let (Xw) be the collection of all w-subsets
(blocks) F ⊆ X . Form a random subset F ⊆ (Xw) of blocks by including each block
independently at random with probability p, where 0 < p < 1. We will determine
the value of p later.
Let V denote the number of blocks in F . Clearly, E(V ) = (vw)p.
To form an (s, t; d)-UIBF, we need to destroy all the subfamilies of cardinality s′+
t′ in F , 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s, 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t, which contradict the definition. For convenience, we
define the forbidden configuration as follows. Let s′ ≤ s, t′ ≤ t be positive integers.
A collection of t′ + s′ distinct blocks {F1, F2, . . . , Ft′+s′} ⊆
(X
w
)
is called an (s′, t′)-
forbidden configuration if there exist s′ distinct blocks, say F1 ⊆ {F1, F2, . . . , Ft′+s′}
with |F1| = s′, such that
|(
⋃
F∈F1
F ) ∩ (
⋃
1≤i≤t′+s′,
Fi /∈F1
Fi)| ≥ d.
Now we are going to count the number of all forbidden configurations in F . Let
X denote the total number of (s′, t′)-forbidden configurations in F for all s′ ≤ s
and t′ ≤ t. Let X(s′,t′) denote the number of (s′, t′)-forbidden configurations in F .
Clearly,
E(X) =
∑
1≤s′≤s,
1≤t′≤t
E(X(s′,t′)).
Note that each (s′, t′)-forbidden configuration is spanned by at most
(t′ + s′)w − |(
⋃
F∈F1
F ) ∩ (
⋃
1≤i≤t′+s′,
Fi /∈F1
Fi)| ≤ (t′ + s′)w − d
points in X . Thus we have
E(X(s′,t′)) ≤
(
v
(t′ + s′)w − d
)(((t′+s′)w−d
w
)
t′ + s′
)
pt
′+s′ .
Indeed, there are
(
v
(t′+s′)w−d
)
subsets of X containing (t′ + s′)w − d points. Each
subset with (t′ + s′)w − d points can generate ((t′+s′)w−dw ) blocks of size w, yielding
at most
(((t′+s′)w−dw )
t′+s′
)
distinct forbidden configurations. Since each block in
(X
w
)
is
included into F independently at random with probability p, any t′ + s′ distinct
blocks in
(X
w
)
are included in F simultaneously with probability pt′+s′ . The above
inequality follows.
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By the linearity of expectation, we have
E(V −X) = E(V )− E(X)
= E(V )−
∑
1≤s′≤s,
1≤t′≤t
E(X(s′,t′))
≥
(
v
k
)
p−
∑
1≤s′≤s,
1≤t′≤t
(
v
(t′ + s′)w − d
)(((t′+s′)w−d
w
)
t′ + s′
)
pt
′+s′ .
(6.5)
Take p = κ′v
d
t+s−1−w, where κ′ is a constant chosen appropriately depending
only on w, s and t. Note that for fixed w, s, t and sufficiently large v, the value of p
always can be chosen such that 0 < p < 1. Then for (6.5) and sufficiently large v,
we have
E(V −X) ≥ κ1vwp−
∑
1≤s′≤s,
1≤t′≤t
κ2v
(t′+s′)w−dpt
′+s′
= κ1κ
′vwv
d
t+s−1−w −
∑
1≤s′≤s,
1≤t′≤t
κ2(κ
′)t
′+s′v(t
′+s′)w−dv(t
′+s′)( d
t+s−1−w)
≥ κ′1vwv
d
t+s−1−w − κ′2v(t+s)w−dv(t+s)(
d
t+s−1−w)
≥ κv dt+s−1 ,
where κ1, κ2, κ′1, κ′2 and κ are constants depending only on w, s and t.
Thus, there exists at least one point in the probability space for which the
difference V − X is at least κv dt+s−1 . That is, there is a family of blocks F which
has at least κv
d
t+s−1 more blocks than forbidden configurations inside. Delete one
block from each forbidden configuration in F , leaving a set B. This set B does not
contain any forbidden configuration, and has at least κv
d
t+s−1 blocks.
This completes the proof. 
We remark here that the order of magnitude of the size of (s, t; d)-UIBF(w, v)
in Theorem 6.3.1 is dt+s−1 , which is extremely close to that of the upper bound,
d dt+s−1e, in Theorem 6.2.1. Especially, when t + s − 1 is a divisor of d, they are
equal.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we focused on UIBF, which is a special kind of CFF. We provided
upper bounds for UIBF in Section 6.2 and a lower bound for UIBF in Section 6.3,
respectively. However, there is still a gap between the upper and lower bounds. It
would be of interest to close the gap for UIBF.
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Chapter 7
Multimedia Parent-Identifying
Codes
Fingerprinting used in multimedia scenario was investigated recently by a number
of authors, see [91, 24] for example. In this chapter, we focus on a kind of anti-
collusion codes for multimedia fingerprinting, namely, multimedia parent-identifying
codes (MIPPCs). The upper bound for MIPPC was given in [22] by establishing a
connection with bipartite graphs without cycles of small length. However, there is
no general lower bounds for MIPPC in the literature. In Section 7.1, we recap some
definitions and the previously related results. Next, we provide the first probabilistic
lower bound for MIPPC in Section 7.2. We analyze the new lower bound for MIPPC
and show that the new lower bound is very close to the known upper bound. Finally,
we summarize this chapter in Section 7.3. This chapter is based on results in [50].
7.1 Definition and known results
7.1.1 Definition
In the unified Definition 5.1.1 of parent-identifying schemes, the set of all authorized
users’ fingerprints for multimedia fingerprinting is a code C ⊆ Qn. Since the most
considered attack model in multimedia fingerprinting is the averaging attack as
formula (1.1), a pirate copy, generated by at most t dishonest users C′ ⊆ C, can
reflect the information of all traitors in C′, that is,
fm(C′) = {desc(C′)} = {C′(1)× C′(2)× · · · × C′(n)},
where
C′(i) = {c(i) ∈ Q : c = (c(1), . . . , c(n)) ∈ C′}
and desc(C′) is called the descendant set of C′.
Example 7.1.1 Let C = {000, 012, 020, 112} and C′ = {000, 012, 020} ⊆ C. Then
C′(1) = {0}, C′(2) = {0, 1, 2}, C′(3) = {0, 2},
and
desc(C′) = {0} × {0, 1, 2} × {0, 2}.
The definition of codes with the identifiable parent property for multimedia
fingerprinting was proposed by Cheng et al. in [22].
Definition 7.1.2 An (n, q) code C has the t-identifiable parent property for multi-
media fingerprinting, denoted t-MIPPC(n, q), if for any subcode C′ ⊆ C such that
|C′| ≤ t, we have ⋂
S∈St(C′)
S 6= ∅,
where
St(C′) = {S ⊆ C : |S| ≤ t, desc(S) = desc(C′)}.
The cardinality of C is called the size of this t-MIPPC(n, q). Denote Nt(n, q) as
the maximum size of a t-MIPPC(n, q). A t-MIPPC(n, q) C is called optimal if it has
size Nt(n, q). When q tends to infinity, the asymptotic code rate of a t-MIPPC(n, q)
with size N is denoted as
Rm(n, t) = lim
q→∞
logqN
n
.
A t-MIPPS(n, q) has the asymptotically optimal code rate if its asymptotic code rate
is
lim
q→∞
logqNt(n, q)
n
.
Example 7.1.3 Let
C =

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2 3 4 1 1 2 3 4
3 4 1 2 1 2 3 4
4 1 2 3 1 2 3 4
 ,
where the column vectors are codewords. By Definition 7.1.2, C is a 3-MIPPC(4, 4)
of size |C| = 8. Indeed, the descendant sets of all C′ ⊆ C such that |C′| ≤ 3 are
distinct.
However, C is not a 4-MIPPC(4, 4), since the first four codewords have the same
descendant set as that of the last four codewords.
7.1.2 Known results
In the literature, Cheng et al. [22] transferred the requirement of a t-MIPPC to
a corresponding bipartite graph without cycles of length less than or equal to 2t,
obtaining the following upper bound.
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Theorem 7.1.4 ([22]) Let n, t, q be positive integers. Then
Nt(n, q) ≤

q
n
2 (q
n
2t + 2c) if n is even
q
n
2 (q
n+1
2t + c(q
1
2 + q−
1
2 )) if n is odd and t is even
q
n
2 (q
n
2t + c(q
1
2 + q−
1
2 )) if n is odd and t is odd,
where c is a constant depending only on t.
From Theorem 7.1.4, we have
Corollary 7.1.5 Let n and t be positive integers. Then
Rm(n, t) = lim
q→∞
logqNt(n, q)
n
≤

1
2 +
1
2t if n is even
1
2 + max{n+12tn , 12n} if n is odd and t is even
1
2 + max{ 12t , 12n} if n is odd and t is odd.
(7.1)
In the next section, we will prove a probabilistic lower bound for MIPPC.
7.2 Probabilistic existence result for t-MIPPC
7.2.1 A lower bound for t-MIPPC
By Definition 5.1.4, we have the following description of forbidden configurations
in a t-MIPPC. Let C be a t-MIPPC, a (minimal) forbidden configuration in C is a
(minimal) configuration F = {F1, . . . ,Fm}, Fi ⊆ C, |Fi| ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, such that
desc(F1) = desc(F2) = · · · = desc(Fm),
that is, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
F1(i) = F2(i) = · · · = Fm(i).
From Theorem 5.1.5, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 7.2.1 An (n, q) code C is not a t-MIPPC(n, q) if and only if there exists
a minimal forbidden configuration in C with size at most u.
Now we are going to prove the existence of good t-MIPPC(n, q) for fixed n, t and
sufficiently large q. From Corollary 7.2.1, we will show that the minimal forbidden
configurations with size at most u are not typical and therefore their probability is
small by using the random coding technique. The process of deriving a lower bound
for t-MIPPC in Theorem 7.2.2 is to first randomly choose a collection of words from
Qn, and then destroy all the possible minimal forbidden configurations with size at
most u by removing one word from each of them.
81
Theorem 7.2.2 Let n and t be fixed positive integers such that n ≥ 2, t ≥ 2. Then
there exists a constant c, depending only on n and t, with the following property.
For all sufficiently large integers q, there exists a t-MIPPC(n, q) with size cq
tn
2t−1 .
Proof: Let Q = {0, 1, . . . , q− 1} be a set of cardinality q. Choose words c1, c2, . . . ,
cM ∈ Qn uniformly and independently at random, where M is an integer to be
decided later. Denote C := {c1, c2, . . . , cM}.
Now we would like to remove some words from C to avoid the forbidden config-
urations of size at most u. To this end, we first define the bad subfamily as follows.
A subfamily C0 ⊆ C is called bad if there exist m subsets of C0, say F1, . . . ,Fm, such
that
(a) C0 =
⋃
1≤i≤mFi and |Fi| ≤ t for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
(b)
⋂
1≤i≤mFi = ∅;
(c) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, F1(i) = F2(i) = · · · = Fm(i).
Now we are going to find out all bad subfamilies in C with size at most u and
remove one word from each bad subfamily. It is clear that u ≥ 2t. The following
process will be divided into two cases according to the size of a bad subfamily: (1)
the size is less than 2t; (2) the size is not less than 2t.
Case 1. We first consider the case when the size of a bad subfamily is less than
2t. Suppose C0 = {f1, . . . , fδ} ⊆ C is a bad subfamily, where 2 ≤ δ < 2t. Then for
each coordinate 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have a useful observation:
|C0(i)| = |{f1(i), . . . , fδ(i)}| ≤ δ
2
. (7.2)
Indeed, for each fj(i), 1 ≤ j ≤ δ, there exists another word fk ∈ C0 \ {fj} such that
fk(i) = fj(i). If not, without loss of generality, we may assume that f1(i) 6= fk(i)
for any 2 ≤ k ≤ δ. Since C0 is a bad subfamily, there exist m subsets F1, . . . ,Fm of
C0 satisfying conditions (a), (b) and (c). By condition (a), there exists a subset Fs,
1 ≤ s ≤ m, such that f1 ∈ Fs. Accordingly, f1(i) ∈ Fs(i). By condition (c), for any
Fj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we have Fj(i) = Fs(i). Thus f1(i) ∈ Fj(i), which implies f1 ∈ Fj .
Accordingly,
f1 ∈
⋂
1≤j≤m
Fj 6= ∅,
which does not satisfy condition (b) and thus contradicts that C0 is a bad subfamily.
Thus (7.2) follows. Actually, the right-hand in inequality (7.2) should be b δ2c, but
we omit the floor-function symbol for convenience.
Based on the above observation, we estimate the probability of the event that
a given δ-subfamily of C forms a bad subfamily. In the following estimation, we
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always consider the case that q is much larger than n and t. Let C0 ⊆ C such that
|C0| = δ, 2 ≤ δ < 2t. Clearly, there are
(
M
δ
)
distinct such C0 in C. Let X(C0) be the
event that C0 forms a bad subfamily. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the i-th coordinates C0(i)
contributes to the event X(C0) with the probability at most(
q
δ/2
)
(δ/2)δ/qδ.
Since each coordinate contributes to the event X(C0) independently, hence we have
Pr(X(C0)) ≤
(
q
δ/2
)n
(δ/2)δn/qδn.
Therefore, the expectation number of bad subfamilies in C with size less than 2t is
at most ∑
2≤δ<2t
(
M
δ
)(
q
δ/2
)n
(δ/2)δn/qδn. (7.3)
Case 2. Next we consider the case when the size of a bad subfamily is not less
than 2t. Suppose C0 = {f1, . . . , fγ} ⊆ C is a bad subfamily, where 2t ≤ γ ≤ u.
Similarly, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have an observation
|C0(i)| = |{f1(i), . . . , fγ(i)}| ≤ t. (7.4)
If not, then |C0(i)| ≥ t+1. Without loss of generality, we may assume that |C0(i)| =
|{f1(i), . . . , ft+1(i)}| = t + 1. Since C0 is a bad subfamily, there exist m subsets
F1, . . . ,Fm of C0 satisfying conditions (a), (b) and (c). By condition (a), we know
that F1(i) contains at most t elements in C0(i), and there exists another Fj , j 6= 1,
such that
Fj(i) ∩ (C0(i) \ F1(i)) 6= ∅.
However, this implies Fj(i) 6= F1(i), which contradicts condition (c) and implies
that C0 is not a bad subfamily. Thus (7.4) follows.
Now we are going to estimate the probability of the event that a given γ-
subfamily of C forms a bad subfamily. Let C0 ⊆ C such that |C0| = γ, 2t ≤ γ ≤ u.
Clearly, there are
(
M
γ
)
distinct such C0 in C. Let X(C0) be the event that C0 forms
a bad subfamily. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the i-th coordinates C0(i) contributes to the
event X(C0) with the probability at most(
q
t
)
tγ/qγ .
Since each coordinate contributes to the event X(C0) independently, hence we have
Pr(X(C0)) ≤
(
q
t
)n
tγn/qγn.
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Therefore, the expectation number of bad subfamilies in C with size ≥ 2t and ≤ u
is at most ∑
2t≤γ≤u
(
M
γ
)(
q
t
)n
tγn/qγn. (7.5)
Now, we form a set B by choosing one word from each bad subfamily in C of size
≥ 2 and ≤ u. Then from (7.3) and (7.5), we have
|B| ≤
∑
2≤δ<2t
(
M
δ
)(
q
δ/2
)n
(δ/2)δn/qδn +
∑
2t≤γ≤u
(
M
γ
)(
q
t
)n
tγn/qγn.
Define Cˆ = C \B. Clearly, any two words in Cˆ are distinct, since we removed one
word from each bad subfamily of size 2. Moreover,
|Cˆ| = |C| − |B|
≥M −
∑
2≤δ<2t
(
M
δ
)(
q
δ/2
)n
(δ/2)δn/qδn −
∑
2t≤γ≤u
(
M
γ
)(
q
t
)n
tγn/qγn.
(7.6)
We claim that Cˆ is a t-MIPPC. Since if not, by Corollary 7.2.1, there exists a minimal
forbidden configuration with size at most u. Correspondingly, there exists a bad
subfamily of size at most u. But we have already destroyed all bad subfamilies in C
by removing one word from it. Thus there does not exist any forbidden configuration
with size at most u in Cˆ. Hence Cˆ is a t-MIPPC.
For sufficiently large q, let M = εq
tn
2t−1 , where ε is a constant chosen appropri-
ately and depending only on n and t. Substituting it into (7.6), we have
|Cˆ| ≥M −
∑
2≤δ<2t
(
M
δ
)(
q
δ/2
)n
(δ/2)δn/qδn −
∑
2t≤γ≤u
(
M
γ
)(
q
t
)n
tγn/qγn
≥M − κ1
∑
2≤δ<2t
M δq−δn/2 − κ2
∑
2t≤γ≤u
Mγq(t−γ)n
= M − κ2M2tq−tn − κ1
∑
2≤δ≤2t−1
M δq−δn/2 − κ2
∑
2t≤γ≤u,
γ 6=2t
Mγq(t−γ)n
≥ εq tn2t−1 − κ2ε2tq
tn
2t−1 − κ′1q
n
2 − κ′2q
n
2t−1
≥ cq tn2t−1 ,
where κ1, κ2, κ′1, κ′2 and c are constants depending only on n and t. The theorem
follows. 
7.2.2 Analysis of the new lower bound for t-MIPPC
We compare the asymptotic code rate of a t-MIPPC between the new lower bound
in Theorem 7.2.2 and the known upper bound in Corollary 7.1.5 for several cases,
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(n, t) (2, 3) (4, 4) (6, 5) (8, 6) (9, 7) (13, 10) (15, 11) (17, 12)
Rm(n, t) ≥ 0.6 0.571 0.556 0.545 0.538 0.526 0.524 0.522
Rm(n, t) ≤ 0.667 0.625 0.583 0.563 0.571 0.554 0.545 0.544
Table 7.1: A comparison of Theorem 7.2.2 and Corollary 7.1.5
0.
50
0.
55
0.
60
0.
65
0.
70
(n, t)
R
_m
(n,
 t)
(2,3) (4,4) (6,5) (8,6) (9,7) (13, 10) (15, 11) (17, 12) (19, 13)
lower bound
upper bound
Figure 7.1: A comparison of Theorem 7.2.2 and Corollary 7.1.5
20 40 60 80 100
t
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.60
code rate
upper bound
lower bound
Figure 7.2: A comparison of upper bound and lower bound for t-MIPPCs
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see Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1. Figure 7.2 also shows that the gap between the known
upper bound and the new lower bound is very small, especially for large t.
Furthermore, we compare the code rate of a t-MIPPC with another kind of multi-
media fingerprinting code, namely, t¯-separable code. Separable code was introduced
in [24] and was studied by several authors, see [16, 21, 23, 24, 47] for example.
Definition 7.2.3 An (n, q) code C is called a t¯-separable code, denoted t¯-SC(n, q),
if for any two subcodes C1 ⊆ C, C2 ⊆ C such that |C1| ≤ t, |C2| ≤ t and C1 6= C2, we
have
desc(C1) 6= desc(C2),
that is, there is at least one coordinate i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that C1(i) 6= C2(i).
The relationship between t¯-SC and t-MIPPC is as follows.
Proposition 7.2.4 ([22]) A t¯-SC(n, q) is a t-MIPPC(n, q).
Proof: The relationship is directly from Definition 7.1.2 and Definition 7.2.3. 
By Definition 7.2.3, the 3-MIPPC(4, 4) shown in Example 7.1.3 is also a 3¯-
SC(4, 4). However, the converse of Proposition 7.2.4 is not always true. That is, a
t-MIPPC(n, q) may not be a t¯-SC(n, q), which can be seen in the following example.
Example 7.2.5 (A t-MIPPC may not be a t¯-SC.)
Let
C =
 1 0 0 10 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
 ,
where the column vectors are codewords. By Definition 7.1.2, C is a 3-MIPPC(3, 2)
of size |C| = 4.
However, C is not a 3¯-SC(3, 2). In fact, let C1 = {100, 010} ⊆ C, C2 =
{100, 010, 110} ⊆ C, then |C1| = 2 ≤ 3, |C2| = 3, C1 6= C2 but
desc(C1) = desc(C2) = {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0},
which contradicts Definition 7.2.3.
When t = 2, Cheng et al. [22] proved that a 2-MIPPC is exactly a 2¯-separable
code. In Theorem 7.2.2, for fixed n such that n ≡ 0 (mod 3) and sufficiently large
q, the asymptotic code rate of a 2-MIPPC can be at least 2/3, which matches the
asymptotically optimal code rate of 2¯-separable code in [47] and [16]. This implies
that, in Theorem 7.2.2, the probabilistic expurgation method provides the 2-MIPPC
with asymptotically optimal code rate when n is a multiple of 3.
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For fixed n ≥ 2, t ≥ 3 and sufficiently large q, Blackburn [16] proved that, when
(t − 1)|n, the asymptotically optimal code rate of a t¯-separable code is 1/(t − 1).
However, the fact
t
2t− 1 >
1
t− 1
implies that a t-MIPPC may provide much more codewords than a t¯-separable code,
which is illustrated in Figure 7.3.
20 30 40 50
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6 code rate
t-MIPPC
\bar{t}-SC
t=10
Figure 7.3: A comparison of lower bounds for t-MIPPC and t¯-SC
7.3 Summary
In this chapter, we concentrated on a kind of anti-collusion codes for multimedia
fingerprinting, that is, MIPPCs. We proved the first probabilistic lower bound for
MIPPCs in Section 7.2. A comparison between the new lower bound and the known
upper bound for MIPPCs was also established. However, there is still a gap between
the lower bound and the known upper bound for MIPPCs in many cases. Clearly,
the possible way to close the gap is to improve either the lower bound or the upper
bound, or both.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Open Problems
In this chapter, we draw a brief conclusion of new results obtained in this disserta-
tion, and also propose several interesting open problems.
8.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we investigated the anti-collusion schemes for broadcast en-
cryption and the anti-collusion codes for multimedia fingerprinting. We derived
new upper and lower bounds for the anti-collusion combinatorial structures and al-
so provided constructions to achieve the new bounds, which greatly improve the
previously known results. In the following, we briefly list the new results in this
dissertation.
I Traceability schemes
• We found a very interesting relationship between traceability schemes and
cover-free families.
• We derived new upper bounds for traceability schemes, which greatly improve
the known results. As a side benefit, we improved the upper bound of cover-
free family in [39] by Erdős, Frankl and Füredi.
• We constructed the optimal t-traceability schemes(w, v) by means of sunflow-
ers for the case w ≤ t2.
• We affirmed that some constructions of traceability schemes by Stinson and
Wei in [85] are in fact optimal. Moreover, we generalized Stinson-Wei’s con-
struction to produce more infinite families of optimal traceability schemes
achieving our new upper bounds by virtue of combinatorial designs.
• We provided a constructive lower bound for traceability schemes, which has
the same order of magnitude with the new upper bounds.
I Parent-identifying set systems
• We introduced a unified concept of parent-identifying schemes to include many
combinatorial structures with the parent-identifying property as special cases.
• We established an equivalent relationship between parent-identifying schemes
and forbidden configurations. Furthermore, we corresponded the research
problems of parent-identifying schemes to a kind of Turán-type problems.
• We derived a new upper bound for parent-identifying set systems, which is
much better than the known bound.
• We provided a probabilistic lower bound for parent-identifying set systems,
which has the same order of magnitude with the new upper bound for certain
cases.
• We analyzed 2-parent-identifying set systems(w, v) and determined the max-
imum size of them for small w.
• We proved better upper bounds for 2-parent-identifying set systems(4, v) and
3-parent-identifying set systems(6, v) by virtue of the well-known graph re-
moval lemma, respectively.
I Union-intersection-bounded families
• We proposed a special kind of cover-free families, called union-intersection-
bounded families, due to its applications in broadcast encryption.
• We showed upper bounds for union-intersection-bounded families by virtue of
techniques in extremal set theory.
• We derived a lower bound for union-intersection-bounded families by means
of probabilistic expurgation method.
I Multimedia parent-identifying codes
• We proved the first lower bound for multimedia parent-identifying codes, which
is much larger than the other kinds of multimedia anti-collusion codes.
8.2 Open problems
In this section, we list several interesting open problems related with the topics in
this dissertation.
• Are there constructions of traceability schemes not from combinatorial de-
signs? Recently, Egorova and Kabatiansky [37] exploited the constant weight
codes to construct 2-traceability schemes. Are there other possible tools?
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• We have already determined the exact maximum size of a traceability scheme
for many cases in Chapter 4. What is the exact maximum size of a traceability
scheme for the other cases?
• How to explicitly construct optimal parent-identifying set systems?
• Is the Conjecture 5.3.5 correct when bt2/4c+ t is not a divisor of w?
• When w is relatively large, such as w is linear with v, how about the size of a
t-parent-identifying set system(w, v)?
• Can the Conjecture 5.5.15 be proved positively?
• For 2-parent-identifying set system(4, v), we proved that I2(4, v) = o(v2)
in Theorem 5.5.7. Is it the case that there exists a 2-parent-identifying set
system(4, v) with size κv2−o(1), where κ is a constant?
• How to explicitly construct optimal union-intersection-bounded families?
• Is it possible to determine the exact maximum size of a union-intersection-
bounded family when s+t−1 is a divisor of d? We have shown it is Θ(v ds+t−1 ).
How about the coefficient?
• What is the exact order of magnitude of the maximum size of a union-intersection-
bounded family when s+ t− 1 is not a divisor of d? It should be some value
between ds+t−1 and d ds+t−1e.
• Is it possible to improve our lower bound for multimedia parent-identifying
codes (Theorem 7.2.2) significantly?
• Can the probabilistic lower bounds for parent-identifying set systems, union-
intersection-bounded families and multimedia parent-identifying codes be ex-
plicitly constructed?
• How about the code rate of a q-ary t-multimedia parent-identifying code for
small q?
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